- Before
- Needs to see what changed, who asked, and what the counterparty said on a line the firm chose, and the answer sat in a mailbox, a phone log and a spreadsheet.
- Now
- Opens each request as one dossier (as received, what changes, the fraud signals and the call-back), asks the agents what they need, then freezes or approves with a reason code and a signature.
A forged SSI change frozen overnight, and a genuine one taken live
Late on a Monday evening at the asset manager in the working solution. At 23:10 an email from a lookalike domain asks it to send all of one broker's US dollar cash settlements to a new account at a bank in Cyprus, “effective immediately.” 23 trades worth $41.6 million settle to the broker's instruction over the next two days. Here is what happens next, screen by screen, in the working solution.
A worked example on sample data. Names, IDs and figures on the screens and in this section come from the demo.
- 01Tuesday, 8:40 a.m.
The agents worked overnight; the team lead starts with what needs a checker
SSI team lead (checker)The team lead's home shows four counts: open change requests and those due today, the 3 held by the agents, those waiting for a checker and those going live this week. Under “Needs you” there is one next step each, the broker first: “a USD account change the counterparty denies on the call-back.” Beside it the agents report the night (the requests read from five channels and the call-backs booked, all to numbers on file), and below it sits a box to ask them, with “What needs me before the 10:00 payment run?” one click away.
Fraud agent, 23:14: “Held 3: the broker at 92, an FX counterparty at 88, a third at 71.”
- 02The queue
This month's change requests from five channels, three held
SSI team lead (checker)Each request is read, linked to the instruction on file and scored before a person sees it, whether it came as an industry database notice, an email, a signed letter, a portal upload or a Swift MT 671 message. “Held by the agents” shows three: the broker at 92, an FX counterparty at 88 because its new RUB bank is on the sanctions list, and a third counterparty at 71. The FX request has already escalated to the head of settlement operations with 82 minutes left on its 4-hour clock.
“SLA clocks: high risk 4 hours, standard 1 business day, authenticated 2 business days.”
- 0323:11 to 23:21, overnight
The dossier: as received, what changes, and why it is held
Intake, Fraud, Source and Checker agentsThe Intake agent read the email and its one-page letter and mapped six changed fields on the broker's instruction: account, bank, BIC, bank country from the US to Cyprus, a new intermediary and the ABA routing number removed, each value cited to its line. The Fraud agent scored it 92: a lookalike sender domain registered six days earlier (+30), a new bank country where the broker's LEI record shows no entity (+20), a signer not on the authorized list (+10) and four signals of +8. The Source agent found the broker's own authenticated record unchanged since June, and the Checker agent passed the BIC, IBAN and sanctions tests, then said what that does not prove.
Checker agent: “Well formed is not the same as genuine.”
- 0408:12
The call-back goes to the number on file instead of the one in the email
SSI data analyst (maker)The Fraud agent refused the Cyprus phone number because it arrived with the request. The Callback agent booked the call to the broker's settlements desk on the master record, re-verified in February, and wrote the script: ask them to read their details out, and do not read the new ones to them. The analyst calls on the recorded line; 2 min 41 s later the transcript is on the dossier and the Callback agent has compared it field by field: 0 of 6 changed fields confirmed.
The broker's settlements manager: “No. We haven't changed our USD instructions, and we sent no such request. Nobody by that name works in settlements.”
- 0508:41
The team lead asks the agents what else this sender tried
SSI team lead (checker)Under the three panels the dossier shows how the agents worked, each step in order with its time, ready to replay, and the conversation with them, each answer with its confidence and sources. The team lead asks: “What else did this sender try?” The Fraud agent answers that two earlier requests this month, in the names of a capital markets firm and a bank, asked for the same Cyprus bank from newly registered lookalike domains. Both were frozen.
Fraud agent: “This looks like one campaign; I will link all three to the case when you freeze.”
- 06Signed
Freeze and escalate, with a reason code and a signature
SSI team lead (checker)With the call-back denied, the dossier offers no Approve, only Freeze and escalate or Reject. The team lead chooses Freeze and escalate, keeps the reason code “Counterparty denied the request on a call-back to the number on file” and signs. The instruction is locked against email and letter changes for 90 days, financial crime gets a case with the evidence, and the agents propose blocking the sender domain. The 23 trades settle to the broker's existing bank as before.
The signature panel: “I sign this decision. My name, the time and the evidence are added to the audit trail.”
- 07Minutes later
$41.6M kept on the instruction on file, and a campaign found
Financial crime officerA financial crime case opens with the evidence already gathered: the email as received, headers showing SPF and DKIM pass for the lookalike domain, the domain's registration date, the call-back transcript and the broker's unchanged record. The Fraud agent's pattern links it to the two earlier attempts ($12.9M and $7.4M protected): three requests in 12 days, one bank, domains registered 5 to 9 days before use, all sent late in the evening. Telling the broker on the number on file, blocking the domain, adding the bank to the watch list and the report decision each need a financial crime officer and are logged.
Fraud cases are “decided by financial crime, never by the agents.”
- 08The same morning
A genuine change in another language, verified by one person and approved by another
Second SSI data analyst (maker)A broker's signed letter, in its own language, moves its equities settlement agent from one trust bank to a custody bank from the following Monday. The Intake agent shows the original beside the English, each field cited to its line; the Source agent finds the same change in the broker's own authenticated record, entered the week before; the risk is 14. The analyst's call-back to the broker's contact on the number on file confirms all three changed fields, and the analyst verifies as maker. The team lead approves as checker; had the team lead verified it, the solution would not let them approve it.
On the call-back, the broker's contact reads out the new bank, the account and the start date.
- 09The go-live date, 00:01 market time
Live at the agreed time, in each system, with a receipt from each
Go-live agentThe approved change is scheduled for 00:01 in the broker's market on its agreed date in the SSI master, the order management system, the custodian and the payment platform, and the Go-live agent collects a receipt from each; trades settling before then stay on the old bank. The calendar shows 27 changes for the week. When custodian B's link failed at 07:58, the banner said so (3 messages queued, a retry every 10 minutes), with Retry now one click away.
The Go-live agent does not activate a change without a maker and a different checker, and does not move an effective date.
- 10Any time after
People and agents, step by step, on a hash-chained audit trail
Head of settlement operationsThe audit trail records who, what, when, why and on which evidence: the analyst's call-back at 08:12, the Callback agent's comparison at 08:16, the team lead's freeze with its reason code, the Fraud agent opening the case and locking the instruction, the second analyst's verification and the team lead's approval. It is append-only, hash-chained and kept 7 years. Verify chain checks it, and Export pack for auditors builds the evidence for one request, one instruction or an exam request.
The head of settlement operations has to prove that each instruction the firm paid to was the firm's to pay.