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NAV triggers in an ISDA: the termination event only funds face

A NAV trigger lets a dealer end every swap with a fund once the fund's net asset value falls by an agreed amount, and it is the term a fund negotiates hardest because a fund has no rating to offer instead. This guide sets out how NAV triggers are built, what central bank research found about how well they work, and how ISDA Negotiation helps a fund counter them.

Updated · 13 min read

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A NAV trigger in an ISDA is an Additional Termination Event, written into Part 1 of the Schedule, that lets a dealer terminate every transaction with a fund if the fund's net asset value falls by more than an agreed percentage over an agreed period: typically one month, three months and twelve months, each with its own level. Dealers ask for NAV triggers because a fund cannot offer what a company offers a lender, a credit rating and permanent capital; investors can redeem, and a falling NAV is the earliest public sign that they are. For the fund, the trigger is the most dangerous number in the Schedule, because it can end the hedges at the bottom of a bad month. Botminds' ISDA Negotiation reads a dealer's NAV trigger wording, places the levels on the fund's playbook, shows what that dealer accepted before, and sends the counter to credit risk for approval.

The research on this page is the European Central Bank's work on the triggers banks used with hedge funds, and the courts' reading of the Master Agreement. Examples of a live negotiation come from a fictional sample fund, Quillfield Global Macro Fund, and a fictional dealer, Thornbury Bank N.A.

NAV triggers: common, blunt and negotiated

15/25/40%

total NAV declines over one, three and 12 months that EU banks typically used as triggers in an ECB survey

ECB, 2007

<2%

of trigger warnings since 1998 were followed by the fund’s liquidation, in the ECB’s test on hedge fund data

ECB, 2007

20%

one-month NAV decline the sample dealer asked for, against the fund’s walk-away of 30%

fictional sample

European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December 2007, Special Feature E, reporting the ESCB Banking Supervision Committee survey of large EU banks and its own analysis of the Lipper TASS database, January 1994 to December 2006. Sample figure from ISDA Negotiation.Source: ECB Financial Stability Review, Dec 2007

What is a NAV trigger in an ISDA?

A NAV trigger is a Termination Event the parties add to the Master Agreement through the Schedule. The printed form leaves a slot for it: the Court of Appeal described Section 5(b) as listing Termination Events "including at sub-section (v) any “Additional Termination Event” specified in the Schedule to the ISDA agreement or in any Confirmation" (Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson, 2012). The trigger's wording, its levels and its look-back periods are all the parties' own; the slot it sits in is the form's.

The wording is short and every word in it matters. The sample dealer's draft read: "the Net Asset Value of Party B declines by 20% or more from the Net Asset Value as of the last Business Day of the immediately preceding calendar month". That sentence fixes three things: the measure (total net asset value, not value per share), the base date (last month-end), and the level (20%). A three-month version in the next sub-paragraph measured from "the third preceding calendar month". Change any one of the three and the trigger fires at a different moment.

The European Central Bank studied these clauses in 2007 and found them common. "Triggers based on the cumulative decline in the total net asset value of a fund are frequently used by banks to protect themselves against credit losses stemming from hedge fund failures," its Financial Stability Review reported (ECB, December 2007).

Why dealers ask for NAV triggers: a fund's capital can leave

A dealer asks for a NAV trigger because it cannot rely on a fund's capital staying put. The ECB put it directly: "The provisional nature of hedge fund capital owing to potential investor redemptions poses a significant risk for hedge fund counterparties and is one of the main reasons why hedge funds are unlikely to receive high credit ratings from rating agencies." A company's equity does not ask for its money back at month-end; a fund's investors can.

Bank supervisors push dealers the same way. The Basel Committee's 2024 guidelines tell banks to watch "material counterparty developments such as changes in the direction of their trading activities and performance (eg net asset value (NAV))", and say that "Banks with sound practices clearly define the types of allowable and necessary contractual terms which affect CCR – including, for example, early termination rights, margin lock- up agreements and default notification periods" (Basel Committee, Guidelines for counterparty credit risk management, December 2024). A dealer's credit policy therefore has a NAV trigger standard, and its negotiator has limited room to drop it.

That is also why the request is the same across dealers but the levels differ. The trigger is the dealer's substitute for a rating downgrade clause, and each dealer calibrates it to its own appetite for the fund's strategy, size and investor base. Once signed, a NAV trigger sits among the additional termination events a fund must be able to find quickly across every agreement, the problem taken up in where additional termination events hide.

How are NAV triggers set: monthly, quarterly or rolling?

NAV triggers are usually set as a ladder of declines over rolling windows, most often one month, three months and twelve months, each with a wider level than the last. The clearest published evidence of the levels banks used comes from a survey by the ECB's Banking Supervision Committee in 2005, in which seven large EU banks reported their triggers, as below.

The NAV decline triggers seven large EU banks reported to supervisors

Bank replyOne monthThree monthsTwelve months
Bank 115%25%35%
Bank 210–20%20–30%50%
Bank 315%25%35%
Bank 415%25%35%
Bank 520–25%25–30%35–40%, from the last fiscal year end
Bank 615%none reported45%
Bank 720%30%40%, for larger funds; smaller funds might have lower triggers
ECB, Large EU banks’ exposures to hedge funds, November 2005, Table 5 (‘NAV decline triggers on a rolling basis’, rows are individual bank replies; triggers ‘normally including redemptions’). Bank numbering is ours. These are 2005 survey replies, not current market levels; no regulator or independent study we know of publishes more recent ones.Source: ECB, Large EU banks’ exposures to hedge funds, 2005

Three design choices show up in those seven rows. The window: most banks used one, three and twelve months; one used no three-month test. The base: one bank measured the twelve-month decline from the last fiscal year end rather than on a rolling basis, which makes the trigger tighten as the year goes on. And the size of the fund: one bank's levels were "All for larger funds, smaller funds might have lower triggers", so a smaller fund faced a tighter trigger for the same strategy.

The 2007 follow-up summarised the pattern: banks "typically used triggers of total NAV cumulative decline of at least 15%, 25% and 40% calculated on a rolling one, three and 12-month basis respectively, although there was some variation in thresholds across and within banks" (ECB, 2007). These are survey figures from 2005; they show the structure a dealer will propose, not where a negotiation will land today.

Should a NAV trigger count redemptions?

Most dealers' triggers count redemptions, because they measure total NAV; funds that can, ask for value per share instead. The difference is the whole point of the clause. The ECB explained that per-share triggers "only take into account the size of negative investment returns", while total-NAV triggers "capture the joint impact of negative performance and investor redemptions". The 2005 survey footnote said the triggers were "Normally including redemptions", and listed among the terms hedge funds pressed for "a definition of NAV based on NAV per share rather than on total NAV" (ECB, 2005).

One bad month, two definitions of NAV: the same fund breaches one trigger and not the other

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording)NAV per share (what funds ask for)
Start of month

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): $4.20 billion

NAV per share (what funds ask for): Value per share 100.0

Investment return

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): −7%, to $3.906 billion

NAV per share (what funds ask for): −7%, to 93.0

Redemptions paid

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): $546 million (13% of opening NAV)

NAV per share (what funds ask for): No effect on value per share

End of month

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): $3.36 billion

NAV per share (what funds ask for): 93.0

Decline measured

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): 20.0%

NAV per share (what funds ask for): 7.0%

20% one-month trigger

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): Breached: the dealer may terminate every trade

NAV per share (what funds ask for): Not breached

30% one-month trigger

Total NAV (the sample dealer’s wording): Not breached

NAV per share (what funds ask for): Not breached

Illustrative arithmetic, not a sample result: a fund with the sample Global Macro Fund’s $4.2 billion starting NAV, a 7% loss and 13% of capital redeemed in the same month, redemptions treated as paid at month-end. Decline = (opening − closing) ÷ opening. Definitions from ECB, Financial Stability Review, December 2007.Source: ECB Financial Stability Review, Dec 2007

A 7% loss is a bad month, not a crisis. With redemptions in the measure, it becomes a 20% decline, and under a 20% trigger the dealer may end every trade. That is the systemic concern the ECB's supervisors raised in 2005: total-NAV triggers meant "a widespread run on hedge funds by investors would give banks the opportunity to terminate all transactions and, if exercised, could escalate financial instability, not to mention having disastrous consequences for the funds affected" (ECB, 2005).

A dealer that will not move to a per-share measure may still accept a wider total-NAV level, a longer window, or a base date that excludes the month's redemptions already notified. Each is a different clause, and each needs its definition checked against Part 1, because NAV trigger definitions often sit in a separate part of the Schedule from the levels.

Is a NAV trigger an event of default?

No. A NAV trigger is a Termination Event, not an Event of Default, and the difference reaches beyond the dealer. The ECB noted that "in contrast to events of default, termination events generally do not trigger cross-defaults with third parties." A fund whose ISDA calls a NAV breach an Event of Default risks a breach that spreads to its other agreements through their own cross-default clauses; the cross-default mechanics are in the guide to the cross default threshold.

It also matters inside the ISDA itself. Section 2(a)(iii) makes each payment "subject to (1) the condition precedent that no Event of Default or potential Event of Default with respect to the other party has occurred and is continuing" (Lomas, quoting the 1992 form). The Court of Appeal held that under that condition a non-defaulting party's payment obligation is "suspended (rather than extinguished)" for as long as the default continues. The condition's first limb names Events of Default, not Termination Events, so a NAV breach worded as a Termination Event does not by itself let a dealer withhold payments; it must designate an Early Termination Date to stop them.

What happens when a NAV trigger is breached?

When a NAV trigger is breached, the dealer gains a right to end the trades the clause covers, which in the sample dealer's draft meant every trade with the fund, and in practice it usually uses that right to renegotiate. The Master Agreement's termination right is built for the whole relationship: after an Event of Default, the Court of Appeal noted, "It is not an option to terminate one transaction and leave other transactions un-terminated" (Lomas, 2012). A fund should read which trades its NAV trigger reaches as closely as the level.

The ECB found that banks seldom pulled it. "Banks are more likely to use breaches as an opportunity to investigate the reasons behind them, rather than choosing the termination option. A breach may free the bank from various obligations to the hedge fund client, for example, in relation to term margins or margin lock-ups, thereby allowing it to raise margin requirements, increase haircuts and possibly introduce additional risk mitigation measures." A breach is therefore a repricing event first: the fund keeps its swaps, at a higher margin.

The termination right still sets the tone of that conversation, and its value to the dealer depends on which way the trades are. A dealer that is out of the money gains little by terminating. Lehman's collapse showed the same logic in reverse: "Many nondefaulting counterparties were out-of-the-money and would have owed large termination payments to Lehman, so they chose not to send a termination notice" (Fleming and Sarkar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014).

Do NAV triggers predict hedge fund failure?

Not well. Testing the three common triggers against hedge fund data from 1994 to 2006, the ECB found they caught between a sixth and two-fifths of liquidations and that almost every warning was a false alarm: "since 1998, based on 24-month moving windows, less than 2% of the warnings issued were correct predictions of cases where liquidation subsequently occurred."

NAV triggers catch some failures and raise many false alarms

−15% in a month · liquidations caught
16.9%
−25% over three months · liquidations caught
25.1%
−40% over 12 months · liquidations caught
41.1%
Any of the three · liquidations caught
43.7%
Any of the three · warnings that were right
1.2%
ECB, Financial Stability Review, December 2007, Table E.2: single-manager hedge funds in the Lipper TASS database, January 1994 to December 2006; a signal is correct if issued on the date of the fund’s last reported returns before liquidation. The share of good signals for each single trigger was 1.35%, 1.48% and 1.48%.Source: ECB Financial Stability Review, Dec 2007

The ECB's conclusion is the fund's best argument at the table: "All in all, it appears that total NAV triggers are not very precise early warning signals of hedge fund liquidation." It added that "other information, e.g. a hedge fund's investment strategy, age, total NAV size or return volatility, should also be taken into account". A fund that offers the dealer that information, more often, has something to trade for a wider trigger.

The research also explains why funds win wider levels from some dealers and not others. "Owing to strong competition among prime broker banks for lucrative hedge fund servicing business, some larger hedge funds have reportedly managed to negotiate relatively low threshold values of total NAV triggers", the ECB wrote, by which it meant triggers that need a larger decline before they fire. Relationship size buys room; a fund's own precedent with the same dealer usually buys more.

How do you negotiate a NAV trigger?

Negotiate a NAV trigger on five levers at once: the level, the window, the measure, the base date, and the remedy. Funds that negotiate only the percentage leave the other four to the dealer's form. The ECB's 2005 survey shows each lever in use: funds pushing for higher levels and per-share measures, and some asking for "“super collateralisation” triggers (i.e. higher margin requirements) instead of early termination".

The strongest argument is the dealer's own history. In the sample negotiation, Thornbury asked for a 20% one-month and 30% three-month trigger. Its four executed agreements with other Quillfield funds showed what it had already accepted:

What one dealer accepted for one-month NAV triggers, agreement by agreement

2019 · Global Equity Income Fund
25%
2021 · Absolute Return Bond Fund
25%
2024 · Multi-Strategy Alternatives Fund
30%
2026 draft · Global Macro Fund (dealer’s ask)
20%
Fund’s counter
30%
Fictional sample: Thornbury Bank N.A.’s executed agreements with Quillfield funds as found by ISDA Negotiation’s Precedent agent (the 2025 ETF agreement had no NAV trigger). Three-month triggers in the same agreements: 35%, 35%, 40%; the draft asked 30%; the counter was 40%. Across 12 executed macro-fund agreements in the sample library, the median one-month trigger was 30%.

The counter anchored on the 2024 agreement, not on the fund's preferred 35%. When the lawyer asked why, the agents' answer was that opening at 35% "would ask Thornbury for more than it ever gave Quillfield", while 30% was hard to refuse and saved a turn before the fund's trading date. The reasoning is ordinary negotiation practice; what changes is that the precedent is on the screen when the lawyer decides, not in a shared drive.

Three drafting checks belong with every counter. Make sure the defined term matches the levels: in the sample, the Schedule's "NAV Trigger Event" definition in Part 5(n) still said 30% over three months after the counter in Part 1(h)(ii) had moved to 40%, which would have undone the counter. Tie the trigger to the NAV reporting clause: the sample fund agreed monthly NAV statements within 15 business days, and the ECB noted intra-month NAV estimates "are not usually used as a basis for a termination event". And write down why the number was accepted, because the next fund will need the same argument; measuring how often concessions leave the playbook starts there.

ISDA Negotiation’s view of one dealer’s NAV triggers across four executed agreements

Precedents screen for Thornbury Bank N.A. with Quillfield: a table of terms against four executed agreements (2019, 2021, 2024, 2025) and the current draft. NAV decline one month: 25%, 25%, 30%, not used; Thornbury asks 20%, off playbook. NAV decline three months: 35%, 35%, 40%, not used; asks 30%. Key person event, cross default for the fund (not applicable in all four; asks applies at $10 million), set-off, eligible collateral, independent amount, interest, notification time and minimum transfer amount follow. Below, a panel shows the one-month NAV trigger by dealer across 12 executed macro agreements with a median of 30%.
Fictional sample in ISDA Negotiation. Only executed or approved positions count as precedent; an agreement older than five years is shown but never used as the anchor.

Who owns the NAV trigger decision at a fund?

Credit risk owns the number; legal owns the words; the general counsel's office owns any concession beyond the playbook. A NAV trigger is a credit term with legal drafting around it, and treating it as a drafting point is how a fund ends up with a 20% trigger nobody in risk approved. In the sample firm's routing rules, NAV triggers, cross default, independent amounts and NAV reporting all go to the credit risk officer within one business day, with escalation to the deputy general counsel.

The credit risk officer's question is the one in the sample approval: at 20%, "a single bad month could let Thornbury terminate every trade with the fund." Approving the counter means checking that number against the fund's own drawdown history and redemption terms, which only the fund knows. A fund with quarterly liquidity and limits on how much can be redeemed at once has less redemption risk inside a one-month window than a fund with monthly liquidity and none, and its trigger can be argued accordingly.

Credit risk approves NAV triggers in ISDA Negotiation with the dealer’s precedent beside each

Approvals screen for Tomás Herrera, credit approver. Waiting items for Thornbury Bank N.A. and Quillfield Global Macro Fund: NAV decline one month with the scale preferred 35%, walk away 30%, Thornbury 20%, counter 30%, 2024 precedent 30%, and the note that at 20% a single bad month could let Thornbury terminate every trade; NAV decline three months, counter 40%; cross default for the fund, counter not applicable, with $10 million shown as 0.24% of the fund's $4.2 billion NAV. Each has Ask, Return and Approve buttons and a due time.
Fictional sample in ISDA Negotiation. The maker of each decision is named and can never approve it; the approver sees the clause, the playbook scale and the dealer’s own precedent together.

That division of labour is the reason the playbook sets a preferred level and a walk-away level for each window, by fund type: the lawyer can move inside the band, credit approves the result, and anything outside the band becomes an exception with two names on it. The playbook's structure is covered in the guide to the ISDA Schedule's elections.

Questions people ask

What is a typical NAV trigger in an ISDA?

No regulator or independent study publishes current market levels. The ECB's survey of large EU banks in 2005, reported in 2007, found triggers of at least 15%, 25% and 40% total NAV decline over rolling one, three and twelve months, with variation across and within banks.

What is the difference between a NAV trigger and a NAV decline trigger?

They are the same clause under two names. Both describe an Additional Termination Event that fires when net asset value declines by a set percentage over a set period; the ECB calls them "NAV decline triggers" or "total NAV triggers" when they count redemptions.

Can a fund cure a NAV trigger breach?

Only if the trigger's own wording gives a cure or remedy period, so it has to be written in. Funds sometimes negotiate a remedy short of termination, such as the "super collateralisation" triggers, meaning higher margin instead of early termination, that the ECB's 2005 survey reported funds requesting.

Do NAV triggers apply to the dealer as well as the fund?

In the sample, as in the ECB's descriptions, they apply only to the fund, because a dealer's credit is measured by its rating. The equivalent clause on the dealer's side is a ratings trigger; in the Lehman v Klaus Tschira litigation, the Schedule made a Lehman entity's failure to maintain a ratings level an Additional Termination Event.

How often must a fund report NAV to a dealer?

As often as the Schedule requires, usually monthly. The ECB found most hedge funds supplied monthly NAV statements, and that intra-month estimates were not usually the basis of a termination event; the sample fund agreed to deliver its month-end NAV within 15 business days.

Should key person events be negotiated with NAV triggers?

Yes, because both are Additional Termination Events in Part 1(h) and dealers trade one against the other. In the sample, the dealer asked for the departure of a named portfolio manager; the counter limited the event to a change of investment manager not replaced by an affiliate within 30 days.

ISDA Negotiation.
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