SystemConsumer Loans & Cards

Synthetic Identity Fraud Detection

Synthetic identity fraud detection that finds the ring, not just the applicant — before the money goes out

Rings caught at application, not at charge-off, each hold explained.

See one case, screen by screen ↓
demo$102,500of credit kept from one ring — new credit, line increases and open lines
demo23.6sfor six agents to check all 10 identities in the ring
demo9of 10names in the ring fail the government SSN check — the tenth is genuine and cleared
demo0.4smedian to score a new application against every one before it
In short

What is Synthetic Identity Fraud Detection?

Finding applicants who do not exist — a real Social Security number joined to a made-up name, date of birth and address — before they are booked or bust out. Synthetic Identity Fraud Detection does it by linking every card and loan application to the ones before it, so identities that share a phone, a device, an address, an employer phone or a funding account show up together as a ring.

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Updated

The problem

Why synthetic identities reach charge-off before anyone calls them fraud

A synthetic identity blends a real Social Security number with a made-up name, date of birth and address. It applies, gets declined, and in being declined gets a credit file. It is added as an authorized user on someone else’s card, pays on time, asks for line increases — then draws everything it can reach and disappears.

Looked at one application at a time, each identity is clean: the file is real at the bureau and the payments were real. The tell is in the set — the same VoIP phone, the same handset, the same mail-receiving store, the same funding account. With no victim to dispute it, the bust-out is booked as a credit charge-off, and the ring’s other identities keep applying.

typical$3.3BUS lenders’ exposure to synthetic identities in 2024, a record
typical18%rise in the share of new accounts opened by synthetic identities, year on year
typical$13Kaverage charge-off per synthetic identity
Where a ring investigation’s hours goestimated
By hand24 days
With the solution3.5 days
  • Spotting that applications are linked6 → 0 d
  • SSN checks and credit files for every name5 → 0.5 d
  • Tracing devices, phones and addresses4 → 0.5 d
  • Comparing ID images and selfies3 → 0.5 d
  • Writing the case file and notices5 → 1 d
  • Decision and second signature1 → 1 d

Estimated split for one ring of about ten identities, worked by hand and with the solution, in hours.

How it works

How a ring is caught

Six specialist agents link every application to the ones before it and check each identity; the fraud analyst decides, an investigator co-signs.

What comes in
Applications in3,400 a day · applications, SSN checks, devices, IDs
Agents at work
Application linkerphone · borrowed card · device · account
Then
Identity verifier
Credit profile analyst
Device and contact checker
Then
Document checker
Then
Case writeractions + case file
A person decides
Fraud analystholds, clears or declines
What comes out
Ring held at application
Case file, report clock
Notices to applicants
One case, step by step

One ring, from linked to co-signed

Sunday night at Corvane Bank, a card application arrives on a handset the bank has seen six times before. Here is what happens next, screen by screen, in the working solution.

  1. 01Monday 09:14

    The book of applications, as a link graph

    Elena Sorvino · Application fraud analyst

    Elena starts the day on the link graph: every card and loan application since February is a dot, and a line means two applications share a phone, a borrowed card, a device, an address, an employer phone or a funding account. In the middle sits a new red cluster — R-2291, the Marrowfield Pike ring: 14 applications from 10 people, $102,500 of credit at stake, 6 applications already held for $83,000.

    Run log: “Application linker cluster score 630 → 904 · ring R-2291 linked · 6 applications held.”

  2. 02Replay · since February

    One phone keeps coming back, just under the hold line

    Application linker

    Elena replays how the ring formed. Applications appear in date order; one VoIP number, (614) 555-0182, draws faint lines between them, but the cluster score stays under the 700 hold line. By Mon 5 Oct, 9 of the 14 applications are in and the score is 540.

    “A recycled VoIP number alone stays under the hold line.”

  3. 03Sun 11 Oct, 23:48

    The seventh application on one handset

    Application linker

    Trevor Lindqvist’s card application, A-58226, is the seventh on Android device D-7F3A. The linker re-reads all 14 credit files and finds the same borrowed authorized-user card, ••9052, on 7 of them. The score jumps to 904 and the whole cluster pulls together; the credit profile analyst pauses 3 line increases on the booked cards.

  4. 04One at a time

    What a one-application check would have seen

    Elena Sorvino · Application fraud analyst

    Switch every link off and the 14 scatter across the book like any other applicants. Each has a real SSN and a credit file. Four of them were booked as cards between February and April.

    “14 unrelated people, each with a real SSN and a credit file — 11 of them would have scored under 300 and passed.”

  5. 0523.6 seconds

    Investigate the ring — every identity checked

    Six agents

    Elena opens the ring and presses Investigate the ring. The identity verifier runs the government SSN check: 9 of 10 no match. The credit profile analyst finds files first seen in 2023–2024 at ages 33–42, 7 of 9 built on borrowed authorized-user cards. The device and contact checker traces one Android handset on 7 applications, a mail-receiving store at 4410 Marrowfield Pike and IPs 340 miles away; the document checker finds 6 IDs on one template, the birth-date font changed on 4.

  6. 06Per identity

    Darnell Okafor: seven of seven checks raise a flag

    Identity verifier

    A-58201, a Corvane Platinum card for $12,000. The SSN is from a range issued after 2011 against a 1984 birth; the credit file was first seen in January 2024 with 3 borrowed authorized-user cards, one of them ••9052; the phone is the VoIP line on 13 applications and the address is a mailbox at the mail-receiving store. Every check carries its source.

    “Decline. Darnell’s SSN does not match Social Security records, the file was built in 2024 on borrowed cards, and 4 of the ring’s elements are on the application.”

  7. 07Per identity

    Simone Achebe: genuine, and cleared

    Elena Sorvino · Application fraud analyst

    Simone is in the ring only because three ring applicants claim to work at Tallow Creek Logistics. She gave the company’s main line, not the ring’s VoIP “HR” number. Her government SSN check matches, her credit file goes back to June 1998, and her license and selfie pass. Score 212: Elena clears her card to underwriting.

    One signal alone never decides — the identity verifier calls an identity synthetic only when the signals agree.

  8. 08Decision

    An action for every application and account

    Case writer

    The case writer recommends: decline 5 applications ($72,000), deny 3 line increases ($16,000), close 4 booked cards ($14,500 in open lines; the $2,140 already drawn goes to recovery) and hold a $3,600 payment from account ••7731 until it clears. Credit kept from the ring: $102,500. Simone’s $11,000 goes to underwriting.

    “At about $13,000 per synthetic identity charged off (Equifax), nine identities is roughly $117,000 of loss if they had busted out.”

  9. 09Signed

    Elena signs, Marcus co-signs

    Marcus Tran · Fraud investigator

    Elena signs the decision with its meaning recorded. Every decline and account closure needs a second person, so it goes to Marcus Tran, who co-signs the 5 declines and 4 closures. Only then are the 5 adverse action notices sent — the reason says only what could not be verified, nothing about the ring.

    “Marcus Tran co-signed · 5 notices sent · case on its 30-day clock.”

  10. 10Case file

    The case file, on its 30-day clock

    Graham Oyelaran · Anti-money-laundering officer

    The case writer has drafted a four-part narrative — summary, identities, activity, action — with 8 exhibits that each open at their source. Detection was Sun 11 Oct, so the report is due Tue 10 Nov: 29 days left. Simone Achebe is left out of the report. Elena refers it to Graham, who decides whether to file.

Who it’s for

Built for everyone who works a fraud hold.

The same ring, seen by the five people who carry it — what their week looked like, and what it looks like now.

ES
Elena SorvinoHolds and clears
Application fraud analyst
Before
Works the hold queue one application at a time; each one looks fine on its own.
Now
Starts the day on the link graph, opens the ring, and holds or clears with every link and check in front of her.
MT
Marcus TranSecond signature on declines and closures
Fraud investigator
Before
Co-signs closures he has to rebuild the evidence for: the link, the date, the document.
Now
Co-signs from a decision where every action carries its reason and every exhibit opens at its source.
JP
Joanne PikeRules and thresholds
Head of Fraud Strategy
Before
Learns which rule would have caught a ring after the ring has busted out.
Now
Reads a weekly pattern report and approves rules the agents have already tested on the last 90 days.
HL
Hana LindgrenID and selfie step-ups
Identity operations lead
Before
Runs ID and selfie step-ups one applicant at a time, without the links that triggered them.
Now
Sees each step-up with its linkage score and the signal behind it — a VoIP phone, an email first seen today, a mail-receiving store.
GO
Graham OyelaranDecides and files reports
Anti-money-laundering officer
Before
Gets a referral and has to write the narrative while the 30-day clock runs.
Now
Receives a drafted narrative, numbered exhibits and the clock — the decision to file stays his.
Built on the engine

6 agents. Each with one job, and hard limits.

Six specialist agents link every application to the ones before it and check each identity; the fraud analyst decides, an investigator co-signs.

Application linker

Links every new application to every earlier one on device, phone, address, email pattern, employer phone, IP and funding account, scores the link and groups linked applications into rings.

  • Never links on a protected characteristic
  • Never declines — only holds
Identity verifier

Runs the consent-based government SSN check, the SSN issuance logic and the credit file’s first-seen age and depth.

  • Never decides on one signal
  • Consent required for every check
Credit profile analyst

Reads tradelines for borrowed authorized-user cards, inquiry velocity, line-increase requests and payments that free credit before they clear.

  • Never changes a credit decision
Device and contact checker

Checks the device fingerprint, IP location and hosting, phone line type, email age and address type.

  • Never contacts the applicant
Document checker

Compares ID images for shared templates and altered fields, and checks selfie liveness.

  • Deletes images after 30 days unless held in a case
Case writer

Writes the recommendation for every application and account, the case file and its exhibits, and the adverse action and closure notices.

  • Never files a report or sends a notice
  • Leaves genuine people out of the report
Fraud analyst

Decides; an investigator co-signs every decline. The agents propose; a named person decides.

Ask in plain words

Ask about any person, link or ring

The analyst can ask in plain words — or ask for the case file to be drafted. Every answer points to its source.

What links Darnell Okafor to the others?

Four things. The VoIP line (614) 555-0182, given on 13 of the ring’s 14 applications; the borrowed card ••9052, on his credit file and six others; device D-7F3A, the Android handset on 7 applications; and Suite 212, 4410 Marrowfield Pike — a mail-receiving store. His SSN does not match Social Security records for his name and birth date.

Why is Simone Achebe in this ring?

Only because of her employer’s name. Three ring applicants claim to work at Tallow Creek Logistics and give a VoIP “HR” number; Simone gave the company’s main line. Everything else is her own: the government SSN check matches and her licence and selfie pass. I recommend clearing her card to underwriting.

How much credit was the ring reaching for?

$102,500 if you take the recommended actions: $72,000 in 5 new applications (Simone cleared), $16,000 in 3 line increases, and $14,500 in 4 open card lines. $2,140 is already drawn and goes to recovery; the $3,600 payment from account ••7731 is held until it clears.

Draft the case file for Marcus

Done — case file R-2291: a four-paragraph narrative and 8 exhibits, each opening at its source. Detection was Sun 11 Oct, so the report is due Tue 10 Nov. Simone Achebe is left out — she is genuine. Marcus sees it when you sign the decision.

Every screen

The working solution, as it ships.

13 screens from the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.

The link graphEvery application since February as a dot, every shared element as a line — rings show up as clusters, with the selected ring’s credit at stake and run log beside it.
Replay, under the hold lineHow R-2291 formed: by 5 Oct, 9 of 14 applications share one VoIP phone, and the score of 540 stays under the 700 hold line.
The ring pulls togetherSun 11 Oct, 23:48: the seventh application on one handset; the borrowed card ••9052 on 7 credit files; score 904.
One at a timeWith every link switched off, the 14 look like unrelated applicants — what a one-application check sees.
Application monitorEvery card and loan application scored on arrival: passed to underwriting, asked for an ID and selfie, or held for a person.
The ring, investigatedThe link map of 10 identities and 7 shared elements, and six agents’ findings, finished in 23.6 seconds.
A synthetic identitySeven checks, each with its source: SSN no match, issuance after 2011, a file built on borrowed cards, a VoIP phone, a mailbox address.
A genuine applicantSSN match, a credit file from 1998, her own phone, device and ID — linked by her employer’s name only, and cleared.
The decisionAn action for every application and booked card, with the reason and the credit kept from the ring.
Signed and co-signedThe analyst signs, the investigator co-signs, and only then do the adverse action notices go out.
The case fileNarrative, numbered exhibits that open at their source, the timeline and the 30-day report clock.
Weekly pattern reportSynthetics caught at application versus after booking, what linked them, and rules the agents suggest — each tested on the last 90 days.
Your fraud policyHold threshold, step-up band, link weights, the SSN check, the second signature, the report clock and image retention.
Governance

Built for fraud decisions you have to defend: explained, co-signed, on the record.

Every hold is explainedEach link names the element and the applications it came from, and every identity check has a Source link to the SSN response, bureau report, carrier lookup or ID image behind it.
Agents hold and recommend; a person decidesThe application linker can hold but never declines. The fraud analyst holds, clears or recommends a decline for every application.
Two people for a decline or closureEvery decline and account closure needs the fraud investigator’s second signature, and notices go out only after it.
No protected characteristic is a linkSurname and any protected characteristic carry a weight of zero. The government SSN check runs only with the consent captured at application.
The report decision stays with AMLThe case file runs on a 30-day clock from detection. The anti-money-laundering officer decides whether to file — the agents never file.
Rules versioned, images deleted on scheduleThreshold and weight changes are versioned and on the audit trail. Photo IDs and selfies are deleted after 30 days unless held in a case.
Configuration

Your fraud policy, not ours

The rules every application is scored and decided by are settings, versioned and on the audit trail.

SettingDefaultChoose from
Hold threshold (linkage score)700500 to 900, in steps of 50
Step-up band — photo ID and selfie500 – 699500 – 699 · 450 – 699 · 550 – 699
Link weightsDevice 30 · funding account 30 · phone 20 · address 15 (×2 if a mail-receiving store) · employer phone 10 · email pattern 5Surname and any protected characteristic: 0
Government SSN checkEvery held applicationEvery held application · Every application · Held and step-up
Pause line increases in an open ringOnOn · Off
Second signature on a decline or closureFraud investigatorFraud investigator · Fraud manager · Any second analyst
Suspicious activity report clock30 days30 days · 25 days (internal target)
Keep ID images for30 days30 · 90 · 7 days
Connections

Works with the systems you already run

Application streamcard and loan applications, scored as they arrive
Government SSN checkconsent-based name, date of birth and SSN match
Credit bureau reportsfirst-seen dates, tradelines, authorized users
Device and contact datadevice sessions, carrier lookup, address type
Uploaded IDs and selfiestemplate, altered-field and liveness checks
Past confirmed fraud casesrings, decisions and the typologies behind them
What it changes

The difference, in numbers.

Every figure is labelled: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.

target
0days
between application and a ring being held — not months later at charge-off
Todayat charge-off
With agentsat application
target
100%
of holds explained by the element and document that linked them
40 of 40 links
each with its source
typical
$13K
average charge-off per synthetic identity, kept off the books

“demo” = seen in the working solution, on its sample data · “estimated” = our estimate · “typical” = published figures: TransUnion H2 2024 Omnichannel Fraud update and 2025 release ($3.2–3.3B lender exposure, +18% synthetic-opened accounts) · Equifax (~$13,000 average charge-off per synthetic identity). People, companies and accounts named on this page — Corvane Bank, Pallas Credit Union, Tallow Creek Logistics and the applicants — are fictional: characters and sample data in the working solution.

Questions

What fraud teams ask us.

What is synthetic identity fraud detection?

Finding applicants who do not exist — a real Social Security number joined to a made-up name, date of birth and address — before they are booked or bust out. Synthetic Identity Fraud Detection does it by linking every card and loan application to the ones before it, so identities that share a phone, a device, an address, an employer phone or a funding account show up together as a ring.

How does it detect a fraud ring?

The application linker scores each new application against every earlier one, weighting each shared element — device, funding account, phone, address, employer phone, email pattern. Applications at or above the hold threshold are held; linked applications are drawn as one cluster on the link graph, with every link and its evidence.

Will it hold genuine customers?

It is built to hold the ring and clear the genuine person who happens to share one element with it. In the working solution, Simone Achebe is linked by her employer’s name only; her SSN check matches and her ID and selfie pass, so she is cleared to underwriting. Scores in the step-up band ask for a photo ID and a selfie instead of a hold.

Does it decline applications on its own?

No. The agents hold and recommend; the fraud analyst holds, clears or recommends a decline, and every decline or account closure needs the fraud investigator’s second signature. Adverse action notices go out only after that signature.

Does it file suspicious activity reports?

No. The case writer drafts the narrative and exhibits, and the case runs on a 30-day clock from detection. The anti-money-laundering officer decides whether to file, and files.

Does it use protected characteristics or surnames as links?

No. Surname and any protected characteristic carry a weight of zero, and the application linker is set never to link on them. The government SSN check runs only with the consent captured at application.

Can we set our own thresholds and signers?

Yes. The hold threshold, the step-up band, the link weights, when the SSN check runs, pausing line increases in an open ring, who co-signs, the report clock and how long ID images are kept are all settings. Changes are versioned and on the audit trail.

How long does it take to go live?

The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your requirements — your fraud policy, link weights, notice templates and a sample of past applications and confirmed fraud cases — and it goes live once every quality gate has passed. We will walk you through it on your own applications first.

See it on
your applications.

We’ll run Synthetic Identity Fraud Detection on a sample of your own past applications and confirmed fraud cases.