Host
The application a person works in — a chat assistant, a code editor, an agent runtime.
One link for every AI assistant in the company. Each person signs in, and their assistant works within their role.
Botminds speaks the Model Context Protocol both ways. Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and VS Code connect to the hosted MCP server with each person’s own sign-in, and Botminds agents call outside MCP servers through allow-lists. Piper, agents and outside assistants share one catalogue of 700+ tools, behind the same checks.
One tool catalogueOne grant checkOne audit trail
An MCP server is a program that offers tools and data to AI assistants through the Model Context Protocol, an open standard. The assistant asks the server what it can do, then calls those tools and reads the results. The Botminds MCP server offers the whole platform this way, to every assistant in the company — and every call runs as the person who signed in, with that person’s permissions.
MCP turns one integration per assistant per system into one contract: a server describes its tools, any client lists and calls them, and the model decides when a tool would help. For a remote MCP server, the enterprise questions — who is calling, what may they see and do — are answered by the platform behind it.
The application a person works in — a chat assistant, a code editor, an agent runtime.
Holds the connection to one server: lists its tools, sends calls, returns results to the model.
Describes tools with names, plain-words descriptions and typed arguments, and runs them.
A local process for desktop tools, or HTTP for a remote server that many people reach from anywhere.
Each Botminds deployment can publish its MCP server at its own address. A person pastes the link into the assistant they already use, signs in through the browser, and allows the connection — no key to hand out, no configuration file to share.
# a terminal assistant
claude mcp add --transport http \
botminds https://<host>/mcp
# sign in when it asks: your browser opens
# Cursor, VS Code and others
{ "botminds": {
"url": "https://<host>/mcp" } }Identity is where a remote MCP server earns trust. The Botminds MCP server holds no identity of its own: every request carries a valid token for one person, and is handled as that person.
Authorization code with a proof key, and self-registration for assistants. Assistants are public clients, so there is no client secret to steal.
Each token names the MCP server it was issued for and carries the MCP scope. Tokens issued for anything else, including a browser session, are refused.
The server holds no shared key and keeps no session between calls, so each caller’s identity stays with that caller.
Signing in proves who is calling. What they may do is the platform’s decision, made the same way for an assistant as for the person clicking through the product. The tool list is shaped to the role, so each person’s assistant offers what fits their work.
Reading, searching, and running what already exists.
Also building agents, fields, workflows and pages.
Also users, roles, keys, connectors and models.
Everything the platform offers.
Piper builds with it, the platform’s agents run with it, and outside assistants reach it through the hosted MCP server. A capability added for one is there for all three — and so are its checks: a permission rule or an audit line added to a tool holds for every caller at once. Tools that delete or replace something ask first; inside Botminds agents a yes is checked against the conversation, and your assistant’s own approval prompt shows each call before it runs.
One rule for every caller: the platform decides each call, as the person behind it.
Botminds agents are MCP clients too. Point an agent at your ticketing system’s MCP server, a code host’s or one you built, and it uses those tools in its run — under the same grants, approvals and records as any other tool.
Remote over HTTP, a local process, or a socket — whatever the server speaks.
A bearer token or an API-key header, stored encrypted and shown in lists and exports only as “saved”.
A connection test lists the server’s tools, so you name exactly the ones each agent needs.
MCP widens what a model can reach. These are the risks security teams raise most, and the control that answers each on Botminds.
An agent reaches the tools it was granted, and you choose which changes wait for a person — so a steered model stays inside what was already allowed.
Tokens are bound to this server, signed, short-lived and checked on every call.
The server acts as the caller, and the platform checks the caller.
Tool lists shaped to the role; agent tools granted by name; outside servers narrowed by allow-lists.
Outside servers’ credentials stay server-side; the runtime reads them server to server.
Each request runs as one person in one workspace they can open.
More on this. Granted tools, approvals and records: AI agent security. Certifications and data protection: the security page.
One address serves every assistant and agent in the company. The hosted server is stateless, so any copy serves any call and copies are added as traffic rises; each copy checks the person’s signed token itself. Behind it, one catalogue of 700+ tools runs on platform services that scale out on Kubernetes, in any cloud and region.
Any copy serves any call. Each checks the person’s signed token itself — no shared session to look up.
Most MCP tools call an API underneath. MCP changes who the caller is — a model choosing tools at run time — and so what the server must describe and enforce.
| REST API | A typical MCP server | Botminds MCP server | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Built for | Programs written against it | AI assistants choosing tools | Assistants, agents and Piper — one catalogue |
| Discovery | Read the docs | The client lists tools at run time | Lists tools, shaped to the caller’s role |
| Who is calling | An API key or a service account | Often a shared key in a config file | The signed-in person, through OAuth |
| Permissions | Whatever the key holds | Whatever the server holds | The person’s role, checked on every call |
| Changes | Run when called | Run when called | Tools that delete or replace something ask first; your assistant’s approval prompt shows each call |
| Revoking | Rotate the key | Edit the config | Disconnect the app, or suspend the person |
| Audit | Request logs | Varies | Changes on the audit trail; connections and consents logged |
| Scale | Your API tier | One process per user, often | A stateless hosted server that scales out |
Both have a place. Services, schedules and back-office jobs use the Runtime API with keys, rate controls and idempotency. People working through an assistant use the MCP server, so the platform knows exactly who is acting.
More from the platform: the full architecture, and how security works at Botminds.
An MCP server is a program that gives AI assistants tools through the Model Context Protocol. The assistant asks what the server can do, then calls those tools and reads the results. The Botminds MCP server offers the platform this way, as the person who signed in.
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard for connecting AI applications to tools and data. A server describes its tools; any MCP client can list and call them. It replaces one-off integrations with one contract.
With OAuth. The assistant discovers where to sign in from the link, registers itself as a public client, and sends the person to the normal Botminds sign-in and a consent card. The token it receives is valid for this MCP server and checked on every call.
Use an API with keys for programs and scheduled jobs. Use the MCP server when a person works through an AI assistant, so every call is made as that person. On Botminds both sit on the same platform rules. See the comparison above.
The protocol is as safe as the server behind it. The risks are borrowed tokens, servers acting with their own power, over-broad tools and leaked keys. Botminds answers each: per-person tokens bound to the server, every call made as the caller, role-shaped tool lists, allow-lists and credentials that stay server-side.
Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, VS Code and any client that follows the MCP authorization spec. Clients that run local servers bridge to the remote link.
Exactly what you can. Every call runs as you and is checked against your role by the same rules the product uses, and tools that delete or replace something ask first — your assistant’s own approval prompt shows each call before it runs.
From the AI clients list, or by asking Piper. The app stops renewing its access, and its access ends when its token expires. To end every connection of a person at once, suspend their account.
Yes. Register the server once, test it, bind it to an agent and set an allow-list of the tools it may use. Credentials stay server-side, and you choose which tools wait for a person’s approval in the conversation.
Yes. One address serves every assistant and agent. The hosted server is stateless and scales out as traffic rises, each person signs in as themselves, and the platform behind it scales out on Kubernetes.
We’ll connect your team’s AI assistant to Botminds on your own data, with your roles, and show the record it leaves.