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Third-Party Sender Due Diligence

Third-party sender due diligence that reaches the layer below the sender

See one case, screen by screen ↓

Built forACH risk analystsBSA officersACH risk committeesFintech oversight managersInternal auditors

The Problem Today

Processors are checked once a year from their own list and a hand-picked sample, so problems are often found first by an examiner.

18 days
of work on one processor's annual review, by hand our estimate
0.5%
unauthorized return level each originator must stay under published

What the analyst checks by hand

  • Roster
  • Screening
  • Evidence
  • Returns
  • Rates seen per sender onlyOriginators over the level hide inside one total
  • Nothing watches in betweenA new originator or entry type waits a year

The Solution

  1. Roster and files readEach originator matched to the entries the bank actually sends
  2. Returns measured one by oneRates per originator from the bank's own files, against Nacha's levels
  3. Hidden senders foundA company sending entries but missing from the roster is flagged
  4. The committee decidesApproves, adds conditions or suspends entries, each with a reason code

Built-in controls

  • Each value opens the record it came from
  • Agents propose; only people suspend or clear
  • Prepare, check and decide are three people

What You Get

Fewer exam findings on the companies behind each sender, because the bank has found and acted on them already.

  • Watched between reviewsA new originator or a rate over a level flagged next morning
  • Audit gaps caughtAn audit that skipped web and phone debits is flagged
  • One pack for the examinerEach finding, decision and signature in one export
In short

What is Third-Party Sender Due Diligence?

It is the work an originating bank does to register a payment processor that sends ACH through it, to know the originators that processor sends for, and to keep each of them inside the Nacha return levels and the bank's own risk criteria. Third-Party Sender Due Diligence does that work one layer deeper than a yearly spreadsheet: each originator on the roster is screened, evidenced and measured from the bank's own ACH files, and each finding carries a reason code and a named approver.

AI use cases in banking: a buyer's guide to agentic AI for bank and credit union operations →

Updated

The problem

Sender-level reviews miss the originators behind a third-party sender

Third-party sender due diligence starts with a simple fact: a third-party sender is a payment processor that originates ACH through the bank for its own clients. The bank registers it, signs an origination agreement and sets a settlement exposure limit, and then answers to Nacha and to its examiners for companies it has never met. Those companies are the ones that debit consumers, and their return rates, their business and their due diligence are the bank's problem long before they are anyone else's.

Once a year the processor emails a roster, in whatever shape it keeps it. A sample is screened by hand, because nobody can screen 1,240 rows. Return rates come out of the payments platform at sender level, because that is the report it prints, and a sender whose own unauthorized rate is 0.18 % can be carrying three originators over the 0.5 % level without a number on any screen moving. Between reviews nothing watches, so a new originator, a new entry type, or a sender hiding behind the sender surfaces a year later, or in an examiner's sample.

typical0.5%the unauthorized return level an ODFI monitors its originators and third-party senders against
typical10daysto register a nested third-party sender once the bank becomes aware of it
typical1a yearrules compliance audit every third-party sender owes, by December 31
Where the working days of one annual sender review goestimated
By hand18 days
With the solution1.8 days
  • Chasing the roster, the audit and the evidence5 → 1 d
  • Screening the originators, a sample, by hand4 → 0.1 d
  • Checking due diligence evidence row by row3 → 0.1 d
  • Pulling return rates per originator out of the files3 → 0.1 d
  • Reading the audit, the agreement and the risk assessment1 → 0.2 d
  • Writing the memo and the committee packet2 → 0.3 d

Estimated split for one annual review of a sender with about 1,200 originators, by hand and with the solution.

How it works

Roster, returns and nesting checks in a third-party sender review

What comes in
What comes in4 sources · roster, ACH files, registration, evidence
Agents at work
Registration agentrecord + agreement
Roster agentevery row, screened
Then
Returns agentrates per originator
Nesting agentthe sender behind the sender
Then
Audit evidence agentdate and scope
Then
Review writerfindings + reason codes
A person decides
BSA Officer, then the ACH Risk Committeeconfirms screening, then decides
What comes out
Signed decision
Remediation plan
Examiner evidence pack
One case, step by step

A payroll third-party sender's annual review, roster to committee decision

The sender, a payroll processor, has originated ACH through the bank for years. Its annual review is due at the end of the month; it sends for 1,240 companies, 412,000 entries a month, $186.4 million. Here is what happens, screen by screen, in the working solution.

A worked example on sample data. Names, IDs and figures on the screens and in this section come from the demo.

  1. 01The review that is due

    The sender at the top, its originators underneath

    ACH risk analyst

    The analyst runs 34 third-party senders with 18,600 originators behind them and 3.2 million entries a month, and opens this one: 1,240 originators as a tree, grouped by industry and entry type. Staffing and payroll, medical and dental practices, property management, fitness and membership, online subscriptions, billing and receivables. Most branches are calm. Five carry a small chip.

    Its own unauthorized return rate is 0.18 % against a 0.5 % level. That is comfortably inside, which is the whole problem.

  2. 02Under two minutes

    Six agents read the registration, the roster and the files

    The agents

    The registration agent reads the registration record and the origination agreement, and lists the Company Identifications actually sending. The roster agent reads all 1,240 rows, with no sampling, screens each name and checks the due diligence evidence on file. The returns agent measures each originator from the bank's own ACH files, and the nesting agent compares what is in the files with what is on the roster. The audit evidence agent reads the audit and the risk assessment, and the review writer turns it all into findings with their reason codes.

    1,240 rows, 6 industry groups, 4 entry types: each row read, with no sampling.

  3. 03One click

    1,240 originators, filtered to the five that need a person

    ACH risk analyst

    A dental practice has no beneficial ownership certification on file. A property manager, a fitness club and an online media company are over the unauthorized return level. One billing company is not an originator at all. A sixth finding is about the sender itself.

    Status is a word as well as a color: returns over level, no due diligence on file, nested sender.

  4. 04The rates

    Measured per originator, against the Nacha levels

    Returns agent

    Over a rolling 60 days, the media company is at 1.12 % unauthorized on 2,144 WEB and TEL debits, and 4.29 % administrative, over both levels. The fitness club is at 0.73 % on 3,718 debits, and the property manager at 0.61 % on 6,430. The codes behind each rate are kept, and the window can be 30, 60 or 90 days.

    All three of the sender's own rates are inside their levels. A sender-level report stops here.

  5. 05One originator

    A company the bank has never met, with all of its evidence

    ACH risk analyst

    The fitness club: its Company Identification, WEB membership dues, 1,859 entries a month, its row on the sender's roster, and the descriptor its debits carry. Screening cleared and was confirmed by the BSA Officer; the business formation document and the beneficial ownership certification are on file; 27 unauthorized returns put it over the level.

    The agents screen and gather evidence, and they do not clear a hit. A named person does.

  6. 06The finding nobody declared

    A sender hiding behind the sender

    Nesting agent

    One Company Identification has sent WEB and TEL debits for 230 days, 56,400 entries and $27.9 million, under the name of a billing company, and there is no row for it in the 1,240 the sender supplied. Its addenda name 37 of its own clients. Its own business is processing payments for small service businesses. The origination agreement has a clause that does not permit it.

    Two clocks: 30 days after the first entry, long since missed, and 10 days from the day the bank knew.

  7. 07Any value

    Each number opens the record it came from

    ACH risk analyst

    The analyst clicks the roster finding and reads the search itself: the roster was searched for the Company Identification and for the billing company's name, and no row matches. The agreement clause, the audit page, the screening run, the return report and the customer due diligence index all open the same way.

    Read by the agents and not changed.

  8. 08The paperwork

    A date is not a scope

    Registration and audit evidence agents

    The registration record says nested senders: no, which the files contradict. The agreement forbids them. And last year's annual rules compliance audit covered PPD and CCD entries only: WEB and TEL were not in scope. 341 originators across four industry groups send them, including all three over a return level. The request to the sender is drafted from the gaps.

    The audit evidence agent does not sign off a scope gap.

  9. 09The decision

    Analyst prepares, BSA Officer checks, committee decides

    ACH risk committee chair

    The chain is on the screen: prepared by the analyst that morning, screening confirmed by the BSA Officer the evening before with all 1,240 cleared, and the decision waiting for the committee. The committee chair suspends the billing company's entries pending registration with a reason code, in the chair's own words, and signs. Switched to internal audit, each of those actions is unavailable and the evidence pack still downloads.

    Report-filing matters are not part of this review; they stay with the BSA Officer in the financial-crime case file.

  10. 10After the decision

    Eight items, each with the evidence that closes it

    ACH risk analyst · oversight manager

    Suspend the entries, register the billing company as a nested sender inside the ten-day clock, amend the origination agreement, get its own risk assessment and audit, run due diligence on its 37 companies, a 60-day rate plan for the three originators, the missing certification, and an audit scope extended to WEB and TEL. Each item names the record that closes it, and the person who raised it cannot close it alone.

Who it’s for

Analyst, BSA Officer, committee chair and oversight manager on one sender

The analyst, the BSA Officer, the committee chair and the oversight manager: what their year looked like by hand, and what it looks like now.

ACH risk analyst
Prepares each review
Before
Screens a sample of the roster by hand, pulls rates at sender level, and writes the memo from email threads.
Now
Opens a review already prepared on all 1,240 originators, reads five chips on a calm tree, and spends the time on what they mean.
BSA Officer
Confirms screening, owns what becomes a report
Before
Signs off screening without seeing the working, on a sample somebody else chose.
Now
Confirms or rejects each screening result with the run behind it, and is the only role that sees the restricted entries.
ACH risk committee chair
SVP Treasury Management, decides reviews
Before
Approves a memo whose evidence lives in a shared folder, and waits a week when an examiner asks for one originator.
Now
Decides on six findings, each with its reason code and its record, and the whole review downloads as one evidence pack.
Fintech partner oversight manager
Owns the sender relationship
Before
Starts each review with an email asking for a spreadsheet, then chases five more things one at a time.
Now
Sends one drafted request covering each gap, with dates, and watches the evidence items close on the queue.
The agents

Seven agents reading one layer below the third-party sender

The registration, the roster, the files and the returns go to seven agents; the analyst prepares, the BSA Officer confirms screening and the committee decides.

Registration agent

Reads the registration record and the origination agreement, lists the Company Identifications actually sending, and reports whether the registration is current and whether nested senders are permitted, quoting the clause.

  • Never registers or amends a registration
  • Never asserts a registration it cannot show
Roster agent

Reads the originator roster in whatever shape it arrives, matches every name and Company Identification to the entries seen, screens each one against the sanctions and prohibited-business lists, and checks the due diligence evidence on file.

  • Reads every row, never a sample
  • Never clears or closes a screening hit; the BSA Officer decides
  • Never opens or changes a customer record
Returns agent

Measures each originator's unauthorized, administrative and overall return rates from the bank's own ACH files over the configured window, against the Nacha levels, and keeps the return codes behind every rate.

  • Read-only on the payments platform
  • Never suspends or releases entries
  • Never adjusts a rate
Nesting agent

Looks for a sender behind the sender: Company Identifications and names that send but are not on the roster, batch descriptors and addenda that name a third party, and originators whose own business is payment processing.

  • Never concludes on its own
  • Never names a nested sender without the evidence that made it suspect
  • Below the confidence floor it stays a question for the analyst
Audit evidence agent

Reads the annual rules compliance audit and the risk assessment, checks the date, the period, the entry types and originators in scope and the findings, and drafts the request for what is missing.

  • Never accepts an audit it has not read
  • Never signs off a scope gap
Review writer

Drafts the review: every finding cited to the record it came from, a recommendation and a reason code for each, the committee packet and the examiner evidence pack.

  • Never approves
  • No claim without a citation
  • Keeps the draft mark until a named person signs
Change watcher

Between reviews, compares each morning's files and rosters with the last review and opens an alert (a new originator, a new entry type, a volume outside the band, a rate over a level, a new unmatched Company Identification) with its evidence and its clock.

  • Cannot close its own alert
  • Cannot change a risk tier
ACH Risk Committee

Approves, conditions or suspends.

Ask in plain words

What analysts ask about a sender, an originator or a return rate

Plain questions, answered from the records on the screen, and the answer can act: filter the tree, open a finding, draft the request. These answers use the sample data.

Why is the billing company a finding?

It is a third-party sender hiding behind a third-party sender. Its Company Identification has sent WEB and TEL debits through the sender for 230 days, 56,400 entries and $27.9 million, and it is not on the roster the sender supplied this month. Its own business is payment processing, and the origination agreement does not permit nesting. The rule gives the bank 10 days from today to register it.

Which originators are over a Nacha level?

Three, all on WEB or TEL debits, over the 0.5 % unauthorized level in the 60-day window: the media company at 1.12 % (and 4.29 % administrative, over both), the fitness club at 0.73 % and the property manager at 0.61 %. The sender's own rate is 0.18 %, comfortably inside, which is why a sender-level report shows nothing.

Did the sender's audit cover WEB entries?

No. Last year's rules compliance audit covered PPD and CCD entries only; WEB and TEL were not in scope. That leaves 341 originators across four industry groups sending entry types the audit did not look at, and all three originators over a return level are among them. The sender's latest risk assessment also does not address nested senders.

Hold the three high-return originators to a monthly rate report

Added as a condition. The media company, the fitness club and the property manager now carry a monthly unauthorized, administrative and overall rate report to the bank for 60 days, with a reason code, a due date and the oversight manager as owner. It is on the remediation plan and goes to the committee with the review. The assistant cannot approve it; the committee chair does.

The screens

Originator tree, hidden sender and committee decision on screen

From the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.

The sender, and each originator behind itThe payroll processor at the top, then the 1,240 companies it sends ACH for, grouped by industry and entry type. Most branches are calm; the few with a problem carry a small chip.
Six agents prepare the review in viewRegistration, roster, returns, nesting, audit evidence and the review writer, each step showing what it read, what it found and the record behind it. Twelve steps, 1 min 48 s.
Only the branches that need a personOne click filters 1,240 originators to five: three over the unauthorized return level, one with no due diligence on file, and a sender hiding behind the sender.
Each originator against the Nacha levelsThe sender's own rates are inside each level, which is why a sender-level report shows nothing. One layer down, three originators are over.
One originator, all of its evidenceIdentity, roster row, descriptor, screening, due diligence and the three rates with their codes, each citing the record it came from.
The sender hiding behind the senderFive pieces of evidence for the billing company, 230 days of entries, and the two clocks the rule sets: 30 days after the first entry, 10 days after the bank knows.
Click any value and read the recordThe roster search that found no row for the hidden sender, shown as the agents read it, and not changed.
Registration, the agreement and the audit's scopeThe registration says no nested senders, the agreement forbids them, and last year's rules compliance audit covered PPD and CCD only.
Who prepares, who checks, who decidesThe chain with its times, the screening confirmed by the BSA Officer, and a notice that report-filing matters stay out of this review.
The decision becomes work with owners and datesEight items drafted from the six findings, each naming the evidence that closes it, and the ten-day registration clock.
The whole program in one queueReviews, change alerts, evidence requests and remediation items across all 34 senders, each with its owner, its date and its SLA.
The program on one pageSenders in the program, reviews current, originators over a level and nested senders found, each opening the list behind it.
Levels and cycles as the bank's settingsReview cycles by tier, the three return levels, the window, the nesting rule and the alert clock: all settings, all versioned.
Governance

Third-party sender due diligence an examiner can follow, record by record

Each value opens its recordA rate opens the return report and its codes, a screening result opens the run, a clause opens the agreement page, an audit scope opens the audit page, and a missing certification opens the due diligence index. Nothing on the screen is asserted without its record.
Prepare, check and decide are three peopleThe analyst prepares the review, the BSA Officer confirms the screening and the committee approves, conditions or suspends. No one holds two of the three, and the chain with its times is on the decision screen.
Each decision carries a reason codeApprove, approve with conditions, suspend entries, dismiss a finding or return the review: each is recorded with a code from the bank's own list, a sentence in the signer's words, the time and the evidence.
Agents propose, and people actNo agent approves, suspends, releases, registers or clears a screening hit. Below the confidence floor set in settings, a finding is shown as a question for the analyst instead of a conclusion.
Reading without touchingInternal audit reads each review, finding, decision and agent step, and downloads the examiner evidence pack; all actions are unavailable in that role. Account numbers are masked except for the roles that need them.
One export for the examinerThe review, each finding with its record, each decision with its reason and signature, and each agent step come out as one evidence pack. Entries in the financial-crime case file are excluded, and only the BSA Officer can add one.
Configuration

Review cycles by risk tier, return levels and the nesting rule

The levels, cycles and clocks the agents apply are settings. Each is versioned, and each change is on the audit trail.

SettingDefaultChoose from
Review cycle by risk tierHigh 12 months · Medium 18 · Low 24High 6 or 12 · Medium 12 or 18 · Low 18, 24 or 36 months
Unauthorized return level0.5 % — the Nacha level0.5 % · 0.4 % · 0.3 %
Administrative return level3.0 % — the Nacha level3.0 % · 2.5 % · 2.0 %
Overall debit return level15.0 % — the Nacha level15.0 % · 10.0 % · 8.0 %
Return windowRolling 60 daysRolling 30 · 60 · 90 days
On a suspected nested senderHold for the committee · 2 business daysHold for the committee · suspend entries on discovery
Change alert SLA5 business days3 · 5 · 10 business days
Second signature above$5,000,000 of daily exposure$2,500,000 · $5,000,000 · $10,000,000
Connections

Rosters, ACH files, agreements and audits read for each sender review

Originator rostersthe list the sender supplies, in whatever shape it keeps it
Payments platformorigination files, return reports and settlement, read-only
Registration and agreementsthe registration record, the origination agreement and its clauses
Sanctions screeningeach originator screened, each potential match to the BSA Officer
Core banking and due diligence evidenceformation documents, beneficial ownership certifications, the evidence index
Audits and risk assessmentsthe annual rules compliance audit and the sender's own risk assessment
What it changes

Per-originator findings between reviews instead of at exam time

Each figure carries its label: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.

demo
1,240of 1,240
originators behind the sender screened, evidenced and measured, the whole roster
Every row read
on the sample review
typical
0.5%
the Nacha unauthorized return level, tested per originator instead of per sender
Sender-level report0 of 3 seen
Per originator3 of 3 found
target
1day
to prepare an annual review, every value citing the record it came from
By handweeks of chasing
With agents1 day

“demo” = seen in the working solution on its sample data · “typical” = published figures (Nacha Operating Rules: the 0.5 % unauthorized, 3 % administrative and 15 % overall return rate levels; registration of a nested third-party sender within the later of 30 days after the first entry or 10 days after the bank becomes aware; the annual ACH rules compliance audit every third-party sender owes by December 31) · “estimated” = our estimate, with the inputs shown; the 18 days for one annual review by hand are the sum of the by-hand split on this page. Names on the screens are sample data.

Questions

Nested senders, return rates and audits in third-party sender due diligence

What is third-party sender due diligence?

It is the work an originating bank does to register a payment processor that sends ACH through it, to know the originators that processor sends for, and to keep each of them inside the Nacha return levels and the bank's own risk criteria. Third-Party Sender Due Diligence does that work one layer deeper than a yearly spreadsheet: each originator on the roster is screened, evidenced and measured from the bank's own ACH files, and each finding carries a reason code and a named approver.

What is a nested third-party sender, and how do you find one?

A nested third-party sender is a processor that has an agreement with another third-party sender instead of with the bank, so the bank may not be told it exists. The nesting agent compares the Company Identifications, company names, batch descriptors and addenda in the bank's own files with the roster the sender supplied. Something that sends but is not on the roster, and whose own business is payment processing, is raised as a suspected nested sender with each piece of evidence and a confidence, for a person to decide.

How are return rates measured per originator?

From the bank's origination files and return reports, over a rolling window of 30, 60 or 90 days. The unauthorized rate comes from R05, R07, R10, R11, R29 and R51; the administrative rate from R02, R03 and R04; and the overall rate from all debit returns. Each is compared with the level in settings (0.5 %, 3 % and 15 % by default), and the codes behind each rate are kept and shown.

Does it check the sender's annual rules compliance audit?

Yes, and its scope as well as its date. The audit evidence agent records the period, the entry types and originators the audit covered and its findings, then compares that scope with what the sender actually originates. An audit that covered PPD and CCD entries while the sender also sends WEB and TEL is a finding, and the request for a scope extension is drafted from it.

Can we set our own levels, cycles and approvers?

Yes. The review cycle per risk tier, the three return levels, the return window, the nested-sender rule, the change-alert SLA, the approver for each decision, the second-signature threshold, the agent confidence floor, the reason-code list, retention and account-number masking are all settings. Each is versioned, and each change is recorded against the administrator who made it.

Can an agent suspend a sender's entries or clear a screening hit?

No. The agents read, screen, measure, draft and propose; they do not approve, suspend, release, register or clear a screening hit. The analyst prepares, the BSA Officer confirms the screening, and the committee decides with a reason code and a signature, with a second signature above the exposure threshold in settings.

What does an examiner get?

One evidence pack: the review, each finding with the record it came from, each decision with its reason code and signature, each agent step, and each action a person took. Entries that belong to the financial-crime case file are excluded, and only the BSA Officer can add one, so nothing in a review, a committee packet or a request to the sender discloses a report-filing matter.

Can we try it on one sender before its next review is due?

Yes. We walk you through it on one of your own third-party senders first. The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your own material (your registration records, origination agreements, a sender's roster and a period of ACH files), and it goes live once each quality gate has passed.

Test third-party sender due diligence
on one sender and its roster.

We'll run Third-Party Sender Due Diligence on one of your own third-party senders and its roster.