Run each investigation drafted as human error, from first draft to submission
- The shift's records in one place, each sourced
- The operator's account without an office interview
- Earlier cases on any line, by mechanism
Human error investigation that reads the shift's own records, draws the equipment from where the operator stood, and keeps human error locked until eight questions have a source.
Follow one line clearance slip to its signed cause ↓A changeover slip is reported at night, and within days the draft reads: operator did not follow the SOP, retrain the operator. The shift's records sit in the MES, the eBR, the roster, the e-logbook and the training system, so the draft is written from one interview in an office and one batch record page.
Nobody asks what the checklist step covered, what the technician could see from the HMI, how many changeovers came before, or who signed the second check and from which terminal. The same trap comes back on the same labeler, filed as labeling one month and equipment the next, and each investigation closes alone.
Built forQA investigatorsQA investigation approversPackaging shift supervisorsHuman factors and training leads
A slip closes as operator error and retraining, and the hidden step behind it waits for the next shift.
Gathered by hand for each slip
Built-in controls
The fix lands on the checklist, the guard and the roster wherever the same labeler is fitted.
QA investigators, approvers, supervisors and the human-factors lead work one night-shift changeover on a bottle line, where labels of the last product turned up behind the labeler's reel guard.
demoSample data on these screens: the lines, people, batches, records and the client.
The investigator builds the case, the approver signs it, operations owns the staffing action, and the human-factors lead owns what the system learns.
Run each investigation drafted as human error, from first draft to submission
Sign root causes and CAPAs, and rule on data-integrity reviews
Staff the shift and agree or object to staffing actions
Review training-only CAPAs and approve the rules the agents learn
Around the decision: the records behind two answers, the trail, the open cases and the settings.
demoSample data, from the working solution.
Results pass from one agent to the next by name, and the drafter passes the case to the approver.
Reads MES events and alarms, eBR signatures and terminals, the roster and the e-logbook for the hours before the event.
Renders the checklist as printed, maps each step to equipment parts and marks what cannot be seen from the work position.
Finds earlier deviations with the same mechanism on any line, recalls the approver's rulings and proposes rules.
Drafts plain, no-blame questions for the operator and the second checker and sends them to their own view.
Plays the inspector against the draft cause and CAPA, and checks the drafter's own scope.
Proposes the root cause, the contributing causes and the CAPA, each with its sources.
Human error investigation asks what in the procedure, the equipment and the shift made a slip easy before a person is named as the cause. Here human error stays locked until eight human-factors questions have a source, and the approver, never the investigator, signs whichever cause the records support.
Retraining assumes the person was the problem. Human error root cause analysis first rules out the checklist, the equipment design, workload, staffing, training, light and communication; EU GMP asks for that justification. Here retraining follows the design change as a briefing.
Because each one closes on its own line under whatever category was typed in. Matching earlier cases by what happened shows labels behind the same guard filed as labeling and as equipment, and the CAPA then covers each line with that guard.
Only the investigator and the approver. The operator answers in their own view, on a screen that says it is not about blame; no agent scores or compares the answers, and their own words stay out of exports.
The challenger flags it as an attestation to a check its signer did not witness. The investigator raises a data-integrity review to QA, kept apart from the no-blame cause, and the approver rules on it before signing anything.
The CDMO's quality unit dispositions the held batch, the client's own quality person releases to market, and the client hears of the deviation as the quality agreement says. Asked whether it can ship, the assistant names the plant's QA release lead and gives no data.
Deviations and earlier investigations, MES line events and alarms, eBR signatures and terminals, the roster, the e-logbook, training records, walk-downs, checklists and drawings, and label reconciliation.
Yes. The queue lists open investigations first drafted as human error by plant and client, and the recurrence finder looks back across all plants, so a trap found on one line is checked on the others.
Every candidate cause proved or ruled out by a record, so the root cause has already answered the inspector.
1-min demoCAPA PlanningPlans that remove the cause from the system, with the test of success written before the work starts.
1-min demoCAPA Tracking & EscalationNo CAPA quietly drifts past its date: every slip is justified, signed and seen.
1-min demoSend one closed line clearance investigation with its checklist and shift records, and we will show which of the eight questions it left open.