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SystemFreight Brokerage

Freight Fraud Prevention

Freight fraud prevention that tests the carrier's identity on each load, link by link, and holds the pickup number until a person decides.

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See one impersonated booking held, screen by screen ↓
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The problem

Four people each see one warning sign, and nobody sees all four

The sales rep takes the offer from whatever address sent it. Compliance reads the certificate, sometimes calling the number printed on it. The rate con goes back to that address, pickup number included. Carrier pay handles a bank change by email, in another mailbox.

So the signs land with different people: a Reply-To on a lookalike domain, a signature phone that is not the phone of record, a policy that does not match the federal filing, a request to pay a new account. Before pickup, nobody has put them side by side.

Tighter registration for new applicants does not reach this. The impostor borrows a carrier already registered, with years of clean authority, and that history is what makes the booking look safe.

Built forFreight brokersCarrier compliance teamsCarrier salesOperations managersCarrier pay teams

The Problem Today

Criminals book loads in the names of clean carriers, and the warning signs sit in separate inboxes until pickup.

$725M
nearly: US and Canada cargo theft in 2025, up 60%, by one count published
1,611
fraud reports to a broker association in six months, up 65% published

Checked by hand today, if at all

  • Headers
  • Phones
  • Certificate
  • Bank change
  • Insurance checked on paperForged certificates carry a scammer's own phone
  • Bank changes paid on trustPay is redirected by email to a new account

The Solution

  1. Every booking read at onceAgents check authority, insurance, email path, phone, truck and pickup
  2. Insurance asked at sourceThe agent of record, found in the insurer's own listing, answers
  3. A challenger attacks itThree known schemes played against each load to find the open path
  4. Two people decide the restA named person decides; a second signs after opening the evidence

Built-in controls

  • Holds are instant; releases need two people
  • Agents report evidence and never accuse anyone
  • Reports and blocks need the lead and counsel

What You Get

The broker tenders only to carriers it can vouch for, and the carrier whose name was used is protected.

$274K
saved per stopped theft, at the 2025 average theft reported our estimate
  • Linked carriers found in one searchA shared phone, domain or bank account ties them together
  • Freight re-tendered to a vetted carrierPriced and timed against the delivery appointment
  • A case file for each decisionWho, what, when, why and what each signature meant
Features

Freight fraud prevention features, booking email to signed re-tender

Carrier compliance, operations and carrier pay use them on loads booked with carriers they have never met. The screens follow one emailed booking in the name of a carrier with twelve clean years.

demoSample data throughout: brokerage, carriers, staff, loads and amounts.

  1. 01Time board

    Carrier identity verification on each load booked today, on one time board

    • A seven-link identity chain per load. Authority, insurance, email path, phone, dispatcher and driver, truck and pickup check sit on one line, so a broken link shows before the dock.
    • One sentence that counts and filters the board. The board says how many chains hold, are still checking, need a person or are held, and each phrase filters to those loads.
  2. 02The run

    Rate con and pickup number held the moment two identity links fail

    • Each agent in its own lane. The compliance manager sees what each agent read, found and how sure it is, with the source one click away, before trusting a hold.
    • Tender documents held when a link fails. The rate con and pickup number stay back from the booking contact on mismatches the agents can prove alone, without waiting on the insurance agency.
  3. 03Booking email

    Carrier impersonation caught in the Reply-To and the sender check

    • Reply-To read against the domain of record. A Reply-To domain is tested for age and against every domain this carrier has used before, so a one-letter or hyphenated copy is caught before anyone replies.
    • Sender checks read from the raw headers. SPF and DMARC results come from the raw headers, so a spoofed From line that a lax DMARC policy let into the sales mailbox still fails.
    • Each contact point marked where it was read. The signature cell, dispatcher and truck number are highlighted, so a checker sees what each agent relied on.
  4. 04Certificate

    Certificate of insurance checked against the policy on federal file

    • Policy number tested against the filing. The policy on the certificate is not the policy the insurer filed, so a forged certificate with a real-looking number fails here.
    • Producer contacts tested against the agency's listing. The email and phone printed for the producer are not the agency's listed contacts, so the number on the certificate is not the one called.
  5. 05Outside requests

    Insurance verified with the agent of record from the insurer's listing

    • Contact taken from the insurer's own listing. The request goes to the address in the insurer's list of appointed agents, so a forger's contact on the certificate is left out.
    • Three structured questions with a due time. In force, issued by this agency, and current policy and limits come back as fixed answers before pickup; any free text goes to a person.
  6. 06Challenger

    Fictitious pickup found as the open path before the truck reaches the dock

    • Three schemes played against the load. Impersonation, double brokering and fictitious pickup run step by step, each step showing the check it would have to beat.
    • The weakest link named. The challenger marks the one step no check would stop, here a dock releasing on the load number alone, so the fix goes where the gap is.
    • A dock rule drafted to close it. The compliance manager sends the shipper a release rule of one-time PIN, driver ID and truck and trailer numbers from the dispatch of record.
  7. 07Identity graph

    Identity graph of phones, domains and bank accounts shared across carriers

    • Phones, domains, senders and accounts linked. A phone in another carrier's packet, a callback number and a remit-to account tie together, so a carrier sharing the impostor's contact points surfaces before pickup or pay.
    • Each link cited to its source. Every line opens the packet, booking email or remit-to request it came from, so the compliance manager checks a link before acting on it.
    • Holding a linked load stays a person's call. The graph accuses no one and holds nothing; the compliance manager holds the linked load, and carrier pay holds its payment.
  8. 08Callback

    Callback to the carrier's phone of record, logged as structured answers

    • The number from the registration record. The dialog shows the phone of record and warns against the number in the booking email, the one an impostor would answer.
    • Fixed answers to fixed questions. Whether they booked this load is answered yes, no or could not reach, and a no turns the dispatcher link red on the chain.
  9. 09Re-tender

    Re-tender to a vetted carrier, priced and timed against the appointment

    • Vetted carriers who ran this lane. Each choice shows its loads on the lane this year, its years of authority and a chain verified today through its own phone of record.
    • Options played forward first. Release, re-tender or rebook show cost, pickup and arrival under hours-of-service limits, so the extra linehaul is weighed against the delivery appointment.
  10. 10Approval

    Second signature only after the operations manager opens the evidence

    • Approve stays off until each document is opened. The booking email and the call record must both be opened before the operations manager can sign the re-tender.
    • Each signature states its meaning. Signing reads as having reviewed the identity evidence, and the original booking contact gets no rate con and no pickup number.

Who runs freight fraud prevention at the brokerage, and what each gets

Four desks touch a booking before the freight moves. Carrier sales sees why a load is held and cannot release it.

Carrier compliance managers

Each held load: callbacks to phones of record, re-tender and release proposals, steering the agents

  • Which link broke, and the source it broke on
  • Structured answers from agents and phones of record
  • Linked carriers surfaced in one search
Operations managers

The second signature on re-tenders and releases

  • Evidence to open before the approve button works
  • Cost, pickup and arrival for each option
  • Held loads listed by their clock
Compliance leads

Rules, bank changes and settings, and with counsel, reports and permanent blocks

  • Report drafts that describe contact points, never people
  • Rules learned from rulings, used only once approved
  • Setting changes that wait for a second person
Carrier pay leads

Remit-to changes and payment holds

  • Bank changes from a lookalike domain held at once
  • A callback to the number already on file
  • Linked payments held before the pay run
Around the case

Pay, pickups, reports and rules around one impersonated booking

The rest of that afternoon at the brokerage, from carrier pay to the audit trail.

Remit-to change heldA 13:52 request from the lookalike domain asks to pay the account ending 4471. Rejecting is immediate; approving needs a callback and a second person.
Pickup checksNo pickup number or PIN has gone out for the held load. Below it, the next three hours of pickups and how each dock releases.
Industry-list reportDrafted after the call: the contact points used, and the named carrier as the one impersonated. The compliance lead takes it over and counsel approves it.
Rule learned from rulingsFive of six past rulings rejected a Reply-To off the domain of record. The proposed rule changes nothing until the compliance lead signs it.
Checks by declared valueLoads over $250,000 add a callback to the phone of record before the pickup number goes out. A change to the domain-age rule waits for a second person.
Audit trailHolds, calls, steers, opened documents and signatures, each with who, when, why and what the signature meant. Exports as a CSV or a case file.

demoSample data, from the working solution.

The agents

Eight agents read the booking, and none can release a load or accuse anyone

Eight readers of one booking email and the records behind it, each with a limit written into its job.

Booking reader

Reads each booking email and its attachments and lists every contact point in it.

  • Never trusts a contact point because the email gives it
Registration record agent

Reads the federal registration record: authority, age, contacts and insurance on file.

  • Never treats an old authority as proof of who is emailing
Email path agent

Reads the headers: Reply-To, Return-Path, sender checks, domain age and past domains.

  • Never decides on the From line alone
Contact agent

Compares the phone with the phone of record and sends the callback text and tracking invite.

  • Never calls or texts a number taken from the booking
Certificate agent

Reads the certificate and asks the agent of record found in the insurer's listing.

  • Never uses a contact printed on the certificate
  • Never treats free text as an answer
Identity graph agent

Links phones, domains, sending servers, bank accounts and addresses across carriers.

  • Never calls a linked carrier a fraudster
  • Never holds a load by itself
Challenger

Plays impersonation, double brokering and fictitious pickup against the load and names the open path.

  • Never says who is behind a booking
Case writer

Writes what the evidence shows, holds tender documents and drafts notices and reports.

  • Never sends a report or blocks a party
  • Never releases a hold

A hold is instant; a release, a report or a block waits for more people

Anything that loosens control needs a second person, and anything sent outside about a party needs counsel.

Releases and re-tenders take two peopleThe compliance manager proposes with a reason; the operations manager or compliance lead signs after opening the evidence.
Bank changes need a callback firstCarrier pay calls the phone already on file, and the compliance lead approves. Rejecting a change, or holding a payment, takes effect at once.
Reports and permanent blocks go through counselThe case writer drafts them, the compliance lead takes them over, and counsel approves.
The impersonated carrier is never blockedIt is told through its email of record and placed on an impersonation watch, so the next booking in its name from a contact off record is held.
No finding names a guilty partyFindings say what the evidence shows. Asked for a verdict, the assistant names the person who decides.

Eight systems behind each load's identity chain

The agents read each one and cite it.

Transportation management systemLoads, carriers and rate confirmations, where holds are set
EmailBooking emails with full headers and attachments
Federal registration dataAuthority, contacts of record and insurance on file
Insurers' agent listingsThe agent of record and its listed contacts
Phone line-type lookupThe line type behind a number, such as an internet phone
TrackingElectronic logging devices and driver apps
Carrier payRemit-to accounts, bank-change requests and payments
Document managementCertificates, onboarding packets and call notes

What freight brokers ask about freight fraud prevention

What is freight fraud prevention?

Freight fraud prevention is the work a broker does to confirm that the carrier on a load is the carrier it claims to be, before freight moves. This solution tests each booking's identity chain, holds the tender documents when a link fails, and leaves the decision to named people.

How does it catch double brokering?

A challenger agent plays the scheme against each load: take the rate con, re-post the load under another name, move the pay. Each step must beat a check: held tender documents, driver names compared at pickup, a remit-to change held for a callback.

Our carrier vetting already scores carriers. What does this add?

Vetting reads the carrier's record, and an impostor borrows a clean one. This reads the booking itself against that record: the email headers, the certificate, the phone in the signature, the call notes and the bank-change mail, load by load.

Can it stop a fictitious pickup?

It finds when the dock is the open path, keeps the pickup number back, and drafts a dock rule for the compliance manager to send: release only on a one-time PIN, driver ID and truck numbers from the dispatch of record. The shipper's dock makes the release.

Who confirms the certificate of insurance?

The agent of record, reached at the address in the insurer's own listing. The agents send structured questions with a due time and hold the load on what they can prove alone.

What happens to the carrier whose name was used?

It is treated as the victim: told through its email of record, watched for impersonation, and never a candidate for a block.

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We will check one of your own bookings with you, link by link, starting from its email headers.

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