Liquidity risk monitoring that names the accounts behind every move: 18 early warning indicators explained and cited before 7:30 a.m., and one decision for the Treasurer, on the record
Every morning, each liquidity move explained by the accounts behind it, before 7:30 a.m.
See one case, screen by screen ↓Liquidity Risk Monitoring is a liquidity risk monitoring system for a bank's treasury and second-line risk teams. Every morning its agents recompute the early warning indicators, the stress survival horizon and internal LCR-style and NSFR-style ratios, name the accounts and payment flows behind each move with the records cited, and put one decision in front of the Treasurer: watch, escalate or act. The analyst confirms the facts, the Treasurer decides with a reason, and the Liquidity Risk Officer checks any escalation.
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Liquidity risk monitoring at most banks is still put together by hand each morning: balances from the core banking system, payments from the payments hub, the general ledger tie-out, stress cash flows from the ALM model, and a spreadsheet of early warning indicators. The note that reaches the Treasurer mid-morning says deposits are down, but rarely who moved the money or where it went. Uninsured, concentrated deposits can leave in hours: in March 2023 one bank's depositors withdrew $42 billion in a single day.
Finding who moved means tracing payments one client at a time. The contingency funding plan names its triggers, but the stage 1 notice is written from scratch on the bad day, and a decision not to escalate is rarely written down, which is exactly what examiners ask to see. Liquidity Risk Monitoring puts seven agents in front of that work. They recompute, explain and draft; the analyst confirms the facts, the Treasurer decides, and the Liquidity Risk Officer checks.
Estimated split of the hours between the overnight data and a decision on one tripped indicator, by hand and with the agents. Our arithmetic, kept modest; the working solution records the real times on its trail.
Agents recompute, trace and draft; the analyst confirms, the Treasurer decides, the second line checks.
Thursday, October 22, 2026, at Corvane National Bank, a fictional US regional bank of about $92 billion in assets. The data is as of the October 21 close: 4.2 million deposit accounts and 1.41 million payments. Here is the morning, screen by screen in the working solution.
Before he arrives, the agents have recomputed all 18 early warning indicators from the core, the payments hub, the general ledger, the treasury management system and the ALM model. Each is one thin line read the same way: the dot is today, the ring is the earlier value, ticks mark the warning level and the limit, and the value is written in words. Today 15 are within, one is past warning, one has tripped, and discount window capacity is marked Stale because the collateral file is late.
Liquidity is sound; one indicator tripped overnight.
Uninsured commercial deposits fell $1.06 billion (4.1%) in three days, from $25.85 billion to $24.79 billion, past the 3.0% limit. The Concentration agent finds where it sits, with confidence 0.97: technology clients fell $0.94 billion, 9.6%, and every other sector moved less than 1%. Beside it is the agents' run, step by step, each with its time, its finding and its confidence, ending in the hand-off to the analyst.
The Explainer traced 2,614 payments to eleven technology clients who moved $763 million, 72% of the drop, with $1.55 billion still on deposit. Names are hidden by default; a permitted role shows them with a logged reason, and each line gives the amount moved, the channel and the relationship manager. The largest, Halvern Robotics, moved $214 million.
A citation opens the payments hub settlement record with the passage highlighted: $214,000,000.00 swept on October 20 at 5:02 p.m. to a third-party government money market fund, after the sweep instruction was changed on October 19 at 2:06 p.m. The account shows only its last four digits.
Sweeps to money market funds took $402 million, wires to 14 other banks, none under stress, $431 million, Treasury bill purchases through custody $164 million, and payroll, taxes and operating payments $63 million. With confidence 0.82, the Explainer finds that 7 of the 11 list the same lead investor, which asked its companies on October 19 to hold no more than two months of cash at any one bank. Owen confirms the facts, the maker step, and they go to the Treasurer.
Below 70% confidence, the Explainer shows a cause as a question for a person, never as fact.
The survival horizon under the combined stress scenario is 61 days, down from 64, against a 45-day minimum and a 55-day warning level. If the eleven move their remaining $1.55 billion this week, it falls to 54 days; if technology uninsured deposits run off 60% in 10 days, to 48; and without the discount window, to 36, under the minimum. The LCR-style and NSFR-style ratios, 118% and 121%, are labeled internal measures.
The agents suggest Watch, with relationship calls by noon, and say when to escalate instead: if E11 passes its limit or the horizon falls under 55 days. Act would use contingent funding now and needs the CFO's approval and the Liquidity Risk Officer's check. Helena chooses Watch, reason code Explained and contained, with a re-check at 2:00 p.m.
Outflows trace to one investor's guidance to its portfolio companies. Horizon 61 days against 45, no market signal. Calls to all eleven by noon; re-check at 2 p.m.; escalate if E11 trips.
Decision D-2026-1022-01 carries the facts, nine citations, who confirmed them and the agents' versions: Explainer prompt v2.7, Monitor v3.4. Eleven relationship calls go to four relationship managers, each with a brief, the intraday watch moves to every 15 minutes, and the record goes to ALCO.
Because E04 tripped and E11 is past its warning level, the Escalation agent drafted the contingency funding plan's stage 1 notice at 7:04 a.m., with its recipients and stage 1 actions such as outreach to the top 50 depositors within one business day and pre-positioning $1.5 billion more collateral at the discount window. It goes only if the Treasurer escalates and Rafael Ibarra, the Liquidity Risk Officer, checks it.
The Escalation agent never sends a notice.
Eight of the eleven clients were reached; the three not reached by noon were escalated to the relationship managers' manager. Five describe operating moves or diversification under investor guidance, two are moving cash for yield, and one plans to move a further $40 million. The outcomes join the decision record for the 2:00 p.m. re-check.
The same tripped indicator, seen by the five people who carry it: what their morning looked like, and what it looks like now.
Agents recompute, trace and draft; the analyst confirms, the Treasurer decides, the second line checks.
Recomputes the 18 early warning indicators, the stress survival horizon and the internal LCR-style and NSFR-style ratios every morning, and runs what-ifs.
Watches the top 50 depositors and sensitive cohorts, such as uninsured commercial deposits by sector and investor networks, and suggests new indicators.
Names the accounts and payment flows behind each move, finds the common thread and drafts the relationship managers' call briefs.
Reads the payments hub every 15 minutes on a stress day, hourly otherwise, and alerts the Treasurer and the analyst at the warning level and the limit.
Drafts the contingency funding plan's stage 1 notice when two indicators trip, and holds a standby draft when one trips and a related one is past warning.
Checks every feed's arrival and completeness and the core-to-general-ledger tie-out, and re-runs the indicators when a late file lands.
Writes the decision record, the weekly ALCO liquidity summary and the examiner export pack.
Maker confirms, Treasurer decides, second line checks. The agents propose; a named person decides.
The analyst, the Treasurer and the second line ask in plain words. Every answer cites the record behind it and opens the screen to act on, and anything it drafts still goes for approval.
Why did uninsured commercial deposits trip?
Technology clients moved cash after their investor's guidance. Uninsured commercial deposits fell $1.06 billion (4.1%) in 3 days; $0.94 billion of it was technology clients, and eleven of them moved $763 million, 72%. Seven of the eleven share a lead investor, which asked its companies on October 19 to hold no more than two months of cash at any one bank.
What if the eleven clients move the rest of their money?
Their remaining balances are $1.55 billion. If all of it left this week, the survival horizon would fall from 61 to 54 days: still above the 45-day minimum, but under the 55-day warning level, which the plan treats as a stage 1 trigger.
Is the discount window capacity number current?
No, it is stale. The collateral management system's 5:00 a.m. file has not arrived, so $6.2 billion is the value from October 21, 6:12 p.m. It matters: without the discount window, the horizon would be 36 days, under the 45-day minimum.
Add a technology-sector indicator at 5% and 8%
Proposed: E19, uninsured technology deposits, 3-day change, warning 5%, limit 8%. Back-tested on this week, it would have warned on October 20, a day before E04 tripped. Limits need the Liquidity Risk Officer's approval and ALCO's ratification, so it now waits for Rafael Ibarra.
13 screens from the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.
Times, triggers, thresholds and retention are settings. Warning levels and limits change only through the limit change: a proposer, the Liquidity Risk Officer's approval and ALCO's ratification.
| Setting | Default | Choose from |
|---|---|---|
| Morning note published at | 7:30 a.m. | 7:00 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. on business days |
| Stage 1 escalation rule | Two indicators past their limits, or the horizon under 55 days | One, two or three indicators; a change is sent for approval |
| Standby notice | On | Drafted when one indicator trips and a related one is past warning |
| Analyst confirms the facts by | 8:15 a.m. | 8:00, 8:15 or 8:30 a.m.; late: Treasurer and Liquidity Risk Officer notified |
| Treasurer decides after a trip by | 9:00 a.m. | 9:00 or 9:30 a.m.; late: CFO notified |
| Relationship calls due by | 12:00 p.m. | 11:00 a.m., 12:00 or 3:00 p.m.; missed calls go to the relationship manager's manager |
| Explainer confidence threshold | 0.70 | 0.70, 0.80 or 0.95; a change goes to the Liquidity Risk Officer for approval |
| Cited payment records kept | 7 years | 5 or 7 years; at least five under BSA recordkeeping |
Every figure is labelled: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.
Sources: Federal Reserve, testimony of the Vice Chair for Supervision, March 28, 2023 ($42 billion withdrawn from one bank on March 9, 2023) · Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and Liquidity Risk Management, 75 FR 13656, March 22, 2010 · OCC Bulletin 2023-25, addendum on contingency funding plans, July 28, 2023 · US LCR and NSFR rules, 12 CFR parts 50, 249 and 329, applying to banking organizations of $100 billion or more. "demo" = seen in the working solution, on its sample data · "target" = design goal, measured in the live solution · "typical" = published figures · "estimated" = our arithmetic, kept modest. The bank, its clients, their payments and the people named on this page are fictional: characters and sample data in the working solution.
Liquidity Risk Monitoring is a liquidity risk monitoring system for a bank's treasury and second-line risk teams. Every morning its agents recompute the early warning indicators, the stress survival horizon and internal LCR-style and NSFR-style ratios, name the accounts and payment flows behind each move with the records cited, and put one decision in front of the Treasurer: watch, escalate or act. The analyst confirms the facts, the Treasurer decides with a reason, and the Liquidity Risk Officer checks any escalation.
In the working solution, 18 in five groups: survival and ratios, deposits and flows, concentration, contingent capacity, and market and wholesale funding. They include uninsured commercial deposits over three days, sweeps to money market funds, the top 50 depositors' share, discount window and FHLB capacity, and public mentions with run-related terms. The indicators, their warning levels and their limits are your policy's, and change only with second-line approval.
The Concentration agent finds the cohort where the move sits, such as uninsured commercial deposits in one sector, and the Explainer traces it through the payments hub and the sweep log to the clients and channels behind it, citing each record. It also looks for a common thread, such as a shared lead investor. A cause below 70% confidence is shown as a question for a person, not as fact.
The Monitor agent recomputes the survival horizon under your combined stress scenario every morning from the ALM model's stress cash flows, against your minimum and warning level. A what-if re-runs it on the clients the agents named, a sector run-off or the loss of discount window capacity, so the decision is made on numbers. It never changes an assumption or the model.
Under the US rules, the LCR and the NSFR apply to banking organizations of $100 billion or more. A smaller bank can still track LCR-style and NSFR-style ratios against internal minimums, and the working solution labels them internal on every screen so nobody mistakes them for a binding rule.
The Escalation agent drafts the stage 1 notice from your plan when two indicators trip, and holds a standby draft when one trips and a related one is past warning. It never sends it: the notice goes only after the Treasurer decides to escalate and the Liquidity Risk Officer checks it, and a funding action also needs the CFO's approval.
Yes. The agents compute, explain and draft; they never decide, send a notice, change a limit or hold a payment. The analyst confirms the facts, the Treasurer decides with a reason code and a note, the Liquidity Risk Officer checks every escalation and limit change, and a recorded decision cannot be edited.
The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your requirements and documents: your liquidity risk policy, contingency funding plan, indicators and limits, and feeds from your core, payments hub, general ledger and ALM model. It goes live once every quality gate has passed.
A plan that works on the day it is needed, with every line tested and every loan counted.
1-min demoDeposit PricingEvery rate exception answered while the member waits, priced against other funding.
1-min demoRisk & Control Self-Assessment (RCSA)Every risk rating grounded in the incidents, losses and tests behind it, then signed.
1-min demoWe'll run Liquidity Risk Monitoring on your early warning indicators and a month of your own balances and payments, and show you the accounts behind each move.