Ground handling audits planned from risk, walked with an agent, and every corrective action proven before the next audit
Fewer audit trips, and every corrective action proven to work before the next audit.
See one case, screen by screen ↓Ground Handling Audit Management is ground handling audit software for airlines that oversee contracted handlers. Eight agents plan each station audit from risk and ISAGO status, brief the checklist from history, guide the auditor's walk-round on the ramp, draft IGOM findings from photos, check them against the manual, review the handler's root cause and prove each corrective action worked. The auditor confirms or rewrites every finding and signs.
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A ground handling audit is how a network airline oversees handlers it does not employ, at dozens of outstations, and it answers to the FAA and to IOSA for them. 14 CFR Part 5 safety assurance must cover contracted services, and the SGHA gives the airline the right to audit. So a small team of auditors flies to each station twice a year with a spreadsheet ramp audit checklist built from IGOM and AHM, takes photos on a personal phone, and writes the findings at night, in their own words, a day or three later.
Then the corrective action is chased by email. The handler answers “staff retrained” or sends a purchase order, the finding is closed on paperwork, and nobody checks the fix worked until the next station audit finds it again — a repeat finding. Meanwhile the audit plan does not move when risk moves, and stations with a current ISAGO audit get the same trip as stations with two damage events this summer.
Estimated split for one outstation audit, from preparation to a closed corrective action, by spreadsheet and email and with the solution. The walk-round itself still needs the auditor on the ramp.
Eight agents plan, brief, guide the walk-round, draft and check findings, and prove each fix; the auditor confirms and signs.
Corvane Airways contracts ground handling at 71 stations to nine handling companies. On Friday, October 16, auditor Rosa Delgado audits Talbrook Ground Services at Phoenix, Terminal 3, gates F4 to F8. Here is that station audit, screen by screen, in the working solution.
Rosa's Today screen shows the PHX audit in progress at 31 of 64 checks, stop 5 of 9, fueling at gate F6. Five handler plans wait for review, two with root causes that look like symptoms, and six fix checks ran this week, one at risk. She works by asking the agents beside the list: “What should I know before the fueling stop?”
“Overnight: the audit briefer pre-filled 64 checks for PHX; the root-cause reviewer read 11 handler replies and flagged 2 as symptoms; the fix verifier ran 6 fix checks and found PHX-25-11 at risk, closed on a purchase order only.”
The audit planner scored all 71 contracted stations on incidents, ground damage, open and repeat findings, handler staff turnover and ISAGO status. PHX ranks 3rd of 71 at 81 of 100: the Aug 22 belt-loader contact ($41,800), 3 fueling safety reports since June, PHX-25-11 closed on a purchase order only, and 38% turnover. Helen Varga moved the PHX audit up from March 2027. Across 2027 the plan proposes 94 audits on site, 30 remote and 18 on the handler's current ISAGO report — 48 trips avoided.
Each line is the QA manager's decision: approve, change or reject, with a reason. The planner never books or cancels an audit.
For audit A-26-PHX-02 the briefer pre-filled 64 checks across 9 stops from IGOM Edition 14, AHM Edition 46 and Corvane's ground operations manual rev. 12, and flagged the 3 tied to history: the bonding clip at fueling, the belt-loader strike at arrival, and 9 new ramp agents at the station office. It lists what changed in the manuals since the March audit, such as Edition 14's hold-door rule: steps or a belt loader, never a ULD loader.
“3 are tied to history and marked; none was removed — mandatory checks never are.”
The walk-round shows the Terminal 3 apron with the 1.4-mile route as nine numbered stops, from the station office to close-out. At fueling, gate F6, CV 1187 to ORD is fueling on N426CV with truck T-14, boarding at 10:50. The companion recalls that PHX-25-11 was this same truck's missing bonding clip, closed on Feb 9 on a purchase order only, and asks one question. On the ramp, Rosa uses the phone view: one stop, one question, one camera button.
“Is the bonding cable connected before the fuel hose?” — IGOM 4.4
Rosa photographs reel R2: the clip is still missing. The finding drafter writes PHX-26-07 in Corvane's standard wording — condition, IGOM 4.4 and Corvane GOM 7.3, the photo and the truck log as evidence, Level 1, a repeat of PHX-25-11. Before Rosa sees it as final, the standards checker reads it against IGOM Edition 14 and the evidence: the paragraph and the level are right, but the wording claims more than the photo shows.
“The photo is at 10:41, after the hose was connected at 10:38, so it shows the cable was not connected before the hose — not that it was never connected.”
Rosa uses the checker's change and signs. A Level 1 finding cannot be signed without containment: “T-14 stood down until a clip is fitted on reel R2; CV 1187 fuels with T-12.” She picks the reason — “The evidence supports the finding” — and her signature sends it to Talbrook and to Helen Varga for co-signature. Cole Brennan, Talbrook's duty manager, confirms the truck is tagged out at 10:52.
PHX-26-07 is one record: the condition, the requirement with its edition, the level and why, the containment, four pieces of evidence that each open their source, the signatures, and the thread with Talbrook. The station manager sees it the same day, not as a PDF a week later.
“Level 1 — could lead directly to a fire · repeat of PHX-25-11 (Oct 21, 2025).”
Helen Varga co-signs at 11:06: “I want the clip check in the daily vehicle check, not only new clips.” Gwen Albright answers in the same thread: the fueler did not follow the bonding procedure; fueler retrained. The root-cause reviewer pushes back — the clip is missing, not a step skipped, and the first fix bought clips nobody checked were fitted. Rosa sends it back; Talbrook's second plan fits clips on all 7 PHX fuel trucks, adds the reel to the daily vehicle check sheet and briefs 19 fuelers by Oct 30, and Rosa accepts it with the reason “Root cause addresses the gap”.
The reviewer recommends send back or accept. It never accepts a corrective action plan itself.
The fix verifier marks PHX-25-11's closure not effective, because it came back as PHX-26-07, and sets checks for the new plan: photos of all 7 reels at 30 days and 10 daily check sheets at 90 days. It checks every other closure the same way — LAS-26-03 held over 41 spot checks, LHR-26-01 is in doubt after a safety report, MSP-26-05 waits on evidence. This year 15 of 19 repeats had been closed on paperwork.
The fix verifier never closes a Level 1 finding alone; reopening is the person's to sign.
The program report shows findings by IGOM chapter — turnaround leads, with fueling and GSE approach, the same causes as the PHX ground damage — the repeat rate against the 3% target, and the trips the 2027 plan avoids. The safety link agent has the open Level 1 findings and the repeats ready for the SMS hazard log, each with its evidence and paragraph, and drafts the Safety Review Board summary for Nov 4.
“I share nothing until the QA manager releases it.”
The same PHX audit, seen by the five people who carry it — from the auditor on the ramp to the handler who fixes the cause and the safety director who tracks the hazard.
Eight agents plan, brief, guide the walk-round, draft and check findings, and prove each fix; the auditor confirms and signs.
Scores every station's risk from incidents, ground damage, open and repeat findings, handler staff turnover and ISAGO status, and proposes how to audit it — on site, remote or rely on the handler's ISAGO report — with the reasons and the trips saved.
Pre-fills each station audit checklist from IGOM, AHM and the airline's ground operations manual, marks the checks tied to last year's findings, this year's incidents and open actions, and lists what changed in the manuals since the last audit.
Guides the walk-round stop by stop, asks the next question, recalls the history at each stop, and files every photo and note as evidence against its check.
Writes each finding in the airline's standard wording: the condition, the requirement with paragraph and edition, the evidence and the proposed level by the severity rules.
Reads every draft against the manual edition, the evidence and the severity rules, and sends back wording that claims more than the photo shows or a paragraph from an old edition.
Reads every handler reply against the evidence and the history, challenges root causes that name a person instead of a cause, and checks the corrective action plan covers every unit and has a date.
Checks each corrective action at 30 and 90 days against new evidence — station photos, spot checks, safety reports and later audits — and marks a closure not effective when the problem comes back.
Shares Level 1 and repeat findings with Ground Safety as SMS hazard log entries, notes trends across handlers, and drafts the Safety Review Board summary.
Signs each finding; the QA manager co-signs Level 1 and repeats. The agents propose; a named person decides.
Ask the agents on any screen, or tell them what to do. Answers cite their sources and open the item; anything that needs a signature waits for a person.
What should I know before the fueling stop?
At PHX the history is at the fueling stop: PHX-25-11, a missing bonding clip on truck T-14 reel R2, was closed on Feb 9 on a purchase order only, and a mechanic reported the cable loose again on Sep 4. I have put the bonding check first at stop 5.
Which handler replies are symptoms?
Two of the 11 replies give a symptom as the root cause. FLL-26-02 says “fueler did not call the cabin crew”, the same answer that closed FLL-25-02. MIA-26-07 says “agent distracted”, but Bayshore's procedure has no time limit for transfer bags. I recommend sending both back.
Why do findings repeat?
19 of 318 findings this year repeat one closed in the last 24 months, and 15 of those 19 were closed on paperwork alone. That is why every closure now gets a 30- or 90-day fix check.
Which audits can rely on ISAGO?
18 audits, at low-risk stations with a current ISAGO station report: ABQ, BTV, PWM, OGG, BZN and SIN need no visit at all, and 12 more use it for one of their two audits. With 30 remote audits that avoids 48 trips, about $148,800.
13 screens from the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.
How stations are scored, how findings are graded and how long each clock runs are settings, and every change is recorded with who made it.
| Setting | Default | Choose from |
|---|---|---|
| Risk weights | Incidents 30% · damage 20% · findings 25% · turnover 15% · ISAGO 10% | Each weight from 0 to 50%; a save replays the plan first |
| How to audit a station | On site above 60 · remote 35–60 | ISAGO report below 35, only with a current report |
| Level 1 finding | Containment 24 h · plan 14 days | Fix checks at 30 + 90 days · QA manager co-signs |
| Level 2 finding | Plan 30 days | Fix check at 90 days |
| Repeat finding | Same condition within 24 months of a closed finding | Clocks as its level · fix checks at 30 + 90 days · QA manager co-signs |
| Reason codes | Root cause is a symptom · No evidence of the fix · Root cause addresses the gap | Also: actions do not cover all units, due date too far, the problem came back, parts on order; add your own |
| Checklist sources | IGOM Edition 14 · AHM Edition 46 | Plus the airline's ground operations manual and de-icing program, each by edition |
| Notifications | Morning summary at 6:00 am | Finding to sign · handler reply · plan due in 3 days · fix check · repeat finding |
Every figure is labelled: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.
“demo” = seen in the working solution, on its sample data · “target” = the design goal, measured in the live solution · “estimated” = our estimate · “typical” = published figures (IATA via Airside International — aircraft ground damage about $5 billion a year; IATA, ISAGO footprint, Oct 1, 2025 — 3,000+ ISAGO audits since 2008, 545 audits foregone by 29 airline groups; FAA 14 CFR Part 5, expanded rule Apr 26, 2024, on safety assurance including contracted services). Corvane Airways, its handlers, stations' findings and the people named on this page are fictional — characters and sample data in the working solution.
Ground Handling Audit Management is ground handling audit software for airlines that oversee contracted handlers. Eight agents plan each station audit from risk and ISAGO status, brief the checklist from history, guide the auditor's walk-round on the ramp, draft IGOM findings from photos, check them against the manual, review the handler's root cause and prove each corrective action worked. The auditor confirms or rewrites every finding and signs.
Usually with a station audit at each outstation: the auditor walks the station office, bag make-up, GSE line, arrival, fueling, loading, load control and pushback against IGOM, AHM and the airline's own ground operations manual, then raises findings the handler must answer with a root cause and a corrective action plan. Here the plan, the checklist, the walk-round, the findings and the handler's answers are in one place.
For some stations, by its own policy. The audit planner proposes relying on the handler's ISAGO report only for low-risk stations with a current report, and keeps every station with a Level 1 finding on site. The QA manager approves, changes or rejects each proposal with a reason. In the sample plan that is 18 audits on ISAGO reports and 30 remote, 48 trips avoided.
In two ways. The root-cause reviewer challenges answers like “staff retrained” that name a person instead of a cause, and checks the plan covers every unit and has a date. Then the fix verifier checks every corrective action at 30 and 90 days against new evidence and marks a closure not effective when the problem comes back, so a repeat is linked and counted.
Part 5 safety assurance (§5.71) asks the airline to monitor the safety performance of its operations, including contracted services. This solution keeps the record that oversight needs: every finding cited to its paragraph and evidence, signed and co-signed, each corrective action decided with a reason and checked, Level 1 and repeat findings shared with Ground Safety as hazards, and a chained audit trail that can be exported for a review. It does not certify compliance; your SMS and quality program stay yours.
Yes. The phone view shows one stop at a time: last year's finding at that stop, one question, Conforms or Not as required, a camera button, and the drafted finding to sign, then the next stop.
Yes. The agents never sign, accept, close or send. The auditor confirms, rewrites or rejects each drafted finding and signs it; Level 1 and repeat findings need the QA manager's co-signature; and every plan acceptance, extension and reopening carries a reason code and an e-signature.
The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your requirements and documents — your oversight policy, severity rules, checklists, manuals and a sample of past station audits and handler replies — and it goes live once every quality gate has passed. Setup walks through handlers and stations, checklist sources, severity and clocks, roles, connections and notifications.
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