Aircraft parts traceability at the receiving dock: every tag checked block by block, and no suspect part reaches the shelf
No suspect part reaches the shelf; every serial keeps its trace to the maker.
See one case, screen by screen ↓Aircraft Parts Traceability checks each part's FAA 8130-3 or EASA Form 1 and its trace at receiving, for quality inspectors. Seven AI agents read every block of the release certificate as the box is opened and compare it with the part, the order, the trace back to the manufacturer, the FAA's repair station records as they stood on the tag's own date, unapproved parts notices and every tag the airline has received before. Clean lines go to stock with one signature; suspected unapproved parts are held for the inspector to confirm, and no suspect part reaches the shelf.
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Every part an airline buys arrives with a release certificate — an FAA 8130-3, an EASA Form 1, a dual release or a certificate of conformity — and a receiving inspector reads it by eye against the quality manual checklist. A forged or photocopied tag looks like any other. Whether the repair station in block 14c held its certificate on the date in block 14e, whether the signature was copied from an earlier tag, or whether the same serial was condemned and sent for scrap years ago is not on the page. The signer is checked against today's list, if at all, and under AOG pressure often not.
When one bad source is found, the work gets harder. Someone has to search receipts, the installed base and shop tags for every other part the same station signed, while the aircraft keep flying. Holds live in a spreadsheet, the FAA suspected unapproved parts report is a Word form that goes late or never, and the same broker can sell to you again. A 2023 forged-paperwork case put unapproved engine parts on airline aircraft on several continents, and the FAA keeps naming parts sold with altered or photocopied tags.
Estimated split, in days, for one suspect source at a network carrier — by hand and with the solution. The by-hand total follows a published vendor estimate of about 14 days for a manual fleet trace.
Seven agents read every tag, check the signer on its date, walk the trace and sweep the fleet; people confirm and sign.
Thursday, October 15, 2026, Corvane Airways main stores at O'Hare. At 07:42 dock 3 opens a box for PO-26-61207 from the broker Brightwater Aviation Parts: an engine-driven fuel pump, P/N 7192-4401-07, S/N HP-30871, for N814CV under WO-26-88412. Here is what happens next, screen by screen, in the working solution.
Dana's Today screen says 46 parts received since 06:00, 38 cleared by the agents and 7 that need her decision, riskiest first. At the top is the fuel pump, a suspected unapproved part already held in Q-ORD-07, with “confirm by 09:46”. Below it, each exception carries the agents' proposal: an EASA Form 1 without an FAA number, a life-limited disk with a back-to-birth gap, sealant with 9 days of shelf life left. The conversation with the agents sits on the right.
“38 lines cleared by the agents. Every block passed, the signer was certificated on the tag date, the trace is complete. They go to stock with your one signature.”
Dana moves a loupe over the scanned FAA 8130-3. Every block carries its result: 22 checks, 5 fail, 6 to look at, 11 pass. Block 14c names repair station certificate VTSR418K for Vantrell Turbine Services, and the FAA's repair station records show it was surrendered on Mar 11, 2022 — four years before the Sep 22, 2026 date in block 14e. The verdict sits beside the tag in one sentence: suspected unapproved part, 97% confident.
Block 14c: “Surrendered Mar 11, 2022. It was not a valid certificate on the date in 14e.”
Dana asks the agents, “Why do you think it is suspect?” The receiving coordinator answers with sources: the surrendered certificate; a signature in block 14b that is a 99.6% pixel copy of two earlier Brightwater tags, from Apr 2024 and Feb 2025; and a serial Halvard Air condemned in 2021. The price, $48,600, is 39% below the 12-month median of $79,400. Beside it, the agents' run shows each step, including the cross-check where the certificate reader and the trace agent agreed on the serial.
“Overlaid, the three strokes are the same to 99.6% — a real signature varies every time.”
The trace agent walks S/N HP-30871 from birth: made new Jun 11, 2014; overhauled by Northline Accessory Repair in 2019; removed from Halvard Air's N47HV on Jul 14, 2021 after a fuel contamination event, condemned and sent to Gulfline Salvage for mutilation, with no mutilation certificate on file. Then five years with no record, until a fresh “overhauled” tag in 2026. The 2021 removal sits in the archive of Halvard Air, which Corvane acquired in 2025; no paper in the box could show it.
“No shop tag, operator record or sale. A condemned part should not exist after this point.”
The agents proposed the hold and blocked issue in the M&E system; only a person can confirm it. Dana picks reason code SUP-1, “Signer not certificated on the release date”, signs with her password, and the FAA report moves to the QA manager to sign.
“Your signature records your name, the time, the reason and its meaning. It cannot be edited afterwards.”
The agent searches 1.18 million receipt lines since 2009 and the installed base of 302 aircraft. Four parts carry VTSR418K: the pump, held; a starter air valve installed on N822CV engine 2, 1,912 flight hours; an IDG oil cooler in ORD stock, bin B-14-03, with a hold for the traceability analyst to approve; and a nozzle set on N809CV signed Nov 3, 2021, while the station was certificated, so it is valid. For N822CV the plan is set against the aircraft's own schedule: replace tonight at ORD between CV 1517 at 22:48 and CV 1402 at 06:10, with serviceable valve S/N SV-20117 from stock, 2.5 labor hours, no flight affected. Graham decides.
“Keep flying with inspection — not proposed: the overhaul cannot be shown to have happened.”
Suspected unapproved parts report SUP-26-004 is drafted from the record: date discovered, part, serial, supplier and price, the release document, why it is suspect, where the part is and the related parts. Every field shows where it came from. The evidence pack holds the 8130-3 scan, four data plate photos, the FAA repair station record, the Halvard removal record, the PO and invoice, the signature comparison and the chain of custody. Only the QA manager signs and sends.
Sign-off: “Signed — QA manager only (GMM 8.4.9).”
Brightwater's score has fallen to 41 and its ASA-100 accreditation expired on Jun 30, 2025. The agent proposes suspending it and holding its two open orders, $31,200, until the FAA report is answered. Two requests for missing non-incident statements are drafted but held until the report is sent, so a suspect seller is not tipped off. Marcus decides.
“I propose suspending Brightwater and holding its 2 open orders ($31,200) until the FAA report is answered. I have not contacted them.”
The agents went live at ORD on Jul 1, 2026; Q2 is the manual baseline. In Q3, 4,212 lines were received and checked, the median per line fell from 26 minutes to 4.2, and the agents raised 318 findings — most of them missing or incomplete blocks (112), missing non-incident statements (64) and trace gaps (41). Three FAA reports were filed.
The same fuel pump, seen by the four people who carry it — what their day looked like, and what it looks like now.
Seven agents read every tag, check the signer on its date, walk the trace and sweep the fleet; people confirm and sign.
Plans each receipt, runs the other agents, weighs what they found, writes the verdict in one sentence with its confidence and proposes a hold.
Reads every block of an FAA 8130-3, EASA Form 1, dual release or certificate of conformity; checks completeness and block logic against FAA Order 8130.21H; fingerprints signature, stamp and tracking-number series against every tag received before.
Compares the tag with the part and the order: part and dash number, serial, data plate photos, quantity, shelf life, PMA eligibility and price.
Walks each serial back to the manufacturer through shop tags, operator removals, scrap and mutilation records and life-limited part cycles, including the records of acquired airlines.
Checks the signing organization, certificate, ratings and dates against FAA repair station records with their history, EASA approvals, distributor accreditation lists and FAA unapproved parts notices.
Turns a confirmed suspect into actions: the hold, a sweep of stock and fleet with a plan per aircraft, the FAA Form 8120-11 draft and the evidence pack.
Requests missing documents on a clock, chases them, scores suppliers and proposes a suspension with its evidence.
Confirm every hold; sign every report and aircraft decision. The agents propose; a named person decides.
Ask about a receipt, its trace, the sweep, a supplier or the cage — or tell the agents what to do. Every answer cites its source.
Why do you think it is suspect?
Three independent things: the repair station in block 14c, VTSR418K, surrendered its FAA certificate on Mar 11, 2022 — four years before the date in 14e; the signature in 14b is a 99.6% pixel copy of two earlier tags from the same broker; and Halvard Air condemned this serial in 2021 and sent it for scrap. The price is 39% below market. Confidence 97%.
Why wasn't this caught in 2024?
The 2024 and 2025 tags from Brightwater were checked by eye before the agents went live on Jul 1, 2026; both looked complete and the inspector had no way to see the 2022 surrender date or the copied signature. The sweep found both today.
Can N814CV still get a pump tonight?
Yes. Corvane stores at DEN holds a serviceable pump, S/N HP-41190, with a full trace to the manufacturer. It can ride CV 1436, arriving ORD 16:40 — before the 22:00 need time for WO-26-88412. Shall I ask the buyer to move it?
Write the quarter's summary for the Director of Maintenance
Q3 2026, ORD receiving: 4,212 lines, every tag checked block by block; median 4.2 minutes a line against 26 in Q2; 318 findings, most of them incomplete blocks and missing non-incident statements; 3 FAA reports filed; no suspect part reached the shelf.
13 screens from the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.
The agents follow your general maintenance manual. Every rule is a setting, and every change is logged.
| Setting | Default | Choose from |
|---|---|---|
| Price below market that raises a warning | 25% | Any percentage, compared with the 12-month median for the part number |
| Signature or stamp similarity that raises a finding | 95% | Any percentage — a real signature varies; a copy does not |
| Minimum shelf life at receipt | 30 days | Any number of days; shorter needs the planner's confirmation |
| Non-incident statement required for used parts | On | On · Off |
| Any back-to-birth gap blocks a life-limited part | On | On · Off |
| Agents place a hold on a suspect part | On — a person confirms within 2 hours | On · Off |
| Check the signer on the tag's own date | On | On · Off — uses the history of FAA repair station records and EASA approvals |
| Supplier document clock | 24 hours, AOG orders 4 hours | Any number of hours |
Every figure is labelled: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.
“demo” = seen in the working solution, on its sample data · “target” = the design goal, measured in the live solution · “estimated” = our estimate (the days split) · “typical” = published figures (a maintenance software vendor's estimate of about 14 days to trace a confirmed counterfeit across a fleet by hand · IBA, Revisiting redeliveries — $2M narrowbody and $4.5M widebody lease-return overspend). Forms and guidance named: FAA Form 8130-3 and FAA Order 8130.21H · FAA AC 21-29D and FAA Form 8120-11 · the FAA Suspected Unapproved Parts program. Corvane Airways, Halvard Air, the suppliers, repair stations and people named on this page are fictional — characters and sample data in the working solution.
Aircraft Parts Traceability checks each part's FAA 8130-3 or EASA Form 1 and its trace at receiving, for quality inspectors. Seven AI agents read every block of the release certificate as the box is opened and compare it with the part, the order, the trace back to the manufacturer, the FAA's repair station records as they stood on the tag's own date, unapproved parts notices and every tag the airline has received before. Clean lines go to stock with one signature; suspected unapproved parts are held for the inspector to confirm, and no suspect part reaches the shelf.
The certificate reader reads every block and checks it for completeness and block logic; the part match agent compares part number, dash number, serial, quantity and the data plate photos with the order; and the registry agent checks that the repair station in block 14c was certificated, with the right rating, on the date in block 14e. The signature, stamp and tracking-number series are compared with every earlier tag. In the working solution one 8130-3 got 22 checks in 3 min 40 s.
With FAA Form 8120-11, as FAA AC 21-29D describes. Once the inspector confirms the hold, the quarantine and report agent drafts the form with every field cited and builds the evidence pack: the tag scan, data plate photos, the repair station record, the trace records, the PO and invoice and the signature comparison. Only the QA manager signs and sends it.
Under the US–EU agreement, the FAA accepts an EASA Form 1 from an EU repair station only when block 12 carries the station’s FAA certificate number. The solution reads EASA Form 1, dual releases and certificates of conformity as well as the 8130-3, and checks the signing organization against the EASA approvals list. In the working solution, a Form 1 from a Hamburg shop with no FAA number in block 12 is stopped and a corrected Form 1 is requested.
Back-to-birth traceability is the unbroken record of a part from manufacture to today. The trace agent walks each serial through shop tags, operator removals, scrap and mutilation records and life-limited part cycles, including an acquired airline's records. Any gap is a finding, and a setting blocks a life-limited part with any back-to-birth gap — in the working solution, an HPT stage 1 disk with 412 cycles unaccounted for.
In the working solution the sweep searched 1.18 million receipt lines since 2009 and 302 aircraft in 2 min 04 s, and found four parts signed under one surrendered certificate: one held, one installed, one in stock and one valid because it was signed before the surrender. A manual fleet trace takes about 14 days by a vendor's estimate.
Yes. The agents read, compare, propose and draft. They never accept a part to stock, release a hold, submit to the FAA, suspend a supplier or touch an aircraft's schedule. The inspector confirms holds, the QA manager releases held parts and signs FAA reports, and the Director of Maintenance decides on installed parts — each with a reason code and an electronic signature.
The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your requirements and documents — your receiving procedure, roles and approvals, supplier lists and a sample of past tags — and it goes live once every quality gate has passed. The working solution's first-time setup loads the tag history and acquired airlines' records, then starts with a 30-day pilot at one store that measures minutes per line and findings.
Every caterer line checked against what was loaded, and every missed penalty claimed.
1-min demoGalley PlanningEvery galley loaded to spec: no cabin short of a meal, no weight flown for nothing.
1-min demoCatering Demand ForecastingMeals ordered for the passengers who board, not the ones booked, and no cabin left short.
1-min demoWe'll run Aircraft Parts Traceability on a sample of your own receiving paperwork and trace records.